PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR
Part I
The proposition and its sense
I
1. ‘How can one talk of ‘understanding’ and ‘not
understanding’ a proposition?
Surely it is not a proposition until it’s understood?’
a proposition
is a proposal – open to question – open
to doubt – uncertain
any interpretation of it – is an understanding
and any
interpretation of it – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
not
understanding a proposition?
if a proposal
– a proposition – is put –
whoever puts
it has an understanding of it –
if others
can’t understand it – that is – can’t interpret it –
the
proposition – the proposal – remains –
open to
question – open to doubt – uncertain
2. ‘Understanding and
signs. Frege against the formalists. Understanding like seeing a picture that
makes all the rules clear; in that case the picture is itself a sign, a
calculus.
“To understand a language”
– to take a symbolism as a whole.
Language must speak for
itself.’
a picture is
a proposal – a proposition –
‘the rules’
of a picture – is an interpretation of the picture – of the proposal –
and ‘one’
interpretation – is not ‘all’ interpretations
any sign – is
open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –
yes – you can
propose a calculus
‘“To understand a language”
– to take a symbolism as a whole.’
a symbolism will be an interpretation
understanding a language is
recognizing its possibilities – engaging with its uncertainty
‘Language must speak for
itself.’
language is proposal –
proposal is open to question
– open to doubt – is uncertain
3. ‘One can say that
meaning drops out of language.
In contrast: “Did you mean
that seriously or as a joke?”
When we mean (and don’t just say) words it seems
to us as if there were something coupled to the words.’
‘One can say that meaning
drops out of language.’ –
meaning drops out of
language where interpretations proposed are not recognized or accepted
meaning is
the interpretation we give language – we give a proposition –
interpretations
come and go –
i.e. “Did
you mean that seriously or as a joke?”
‘When we mean (and don’t just say) words it seems
to us as if there were something coupled to the words.’
when we mean
– and don’t just say the words – we determine
an interpretation –
we stop
questioning – we stop doubting – and go with what we have decided upon
any
determination is a pragmatic action
and any
propositional determination – from a logical point of view is open to question
open to doubt – is uncertain
4. ‘Comparison with
understanding a piece of music: for explanation I can only translate the
musical picture into a picture in another medium – and why just that picture?
Comparison with understanding a picture. Perhaps we see only patches and lines
– “we do not understand the picture”. Seeing a genre-picture in different
ways.’
the ‘musical picture’ is
an interpretation of a proposal –
a propositional
construction on the initial proposal
and like the proposal
itself – the interpretation is open to question
and any translation is
open to question –
yes – you could regard
the translation – as another picture – a picture in a different form –
but there is no
necessity to do this – to see it this way – and there is no necessity to carry
on with the original interpretation
it depends on what you
are doing – but a ‘picture’ interpretation – may not be useful –
or may out live its
usefulness
perhaps we see patches and lines – all very well –
but yes – a picture like a piece of music – like a sentence
– can be interpreted – in any number of ways
and with any interpretation – understanding
5. ‘ “ I understand this gesture” – it says
something.
In a sentence a word can be
felt as belonging first with one word and then with another.
A ‘proposition’ may be what
is conceived in different ways or the way of conceiving itself.
A sentence from the middle
of a story I have not read.
The concept of
understanding is a fluid one.’
“ I understand this
gesture” – it says something –
here the gesture is a
proposal – a proposition –
open to question – open to
doubt
the claim to understand –
is to have an interpretation of the proposal
‘In a sentence a word can
be felt as belonging first with one word and then with another.’
yes in any arrangement of
words there is uncertainty
‘A ‘proposition’ may be
what is conceived in different ways or the way of conceiving itself.’ –
yes – a proposition can be
conceived in any number of ways –
different proposals of
interpretation can be advanced
a proposition does not
conceive itself
‘A sentence from the middle
of a story I have not read.’ –
is open to question – open
to interpretation
‘The concept of
understanding is a fluid one.’ –
open to question – open to
doubt - uncertain
6. ‘A sentence in a code:
at what moment of translating does understanding begin?
The words of a sentence are
arbitrary; so I replace them with letters. But now I cannot immediately think
the sense of the sentence in the new expression.
The notion that we can only
imperfectly exhibit our
understanding: the expression of understanding has something that is essentially inexpressible. But in that
case it makes no sense to speak of a more complete expression.’
a sentence is
a proposal
a proposal is
open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
understanding
of a sentence / proposal begins with
question – with doubt –
with
recognizing the uncertainty of the sentence / proposal
if you replace the words with letters you
translate from one form of expression to another
the sense of
the original expression – as with any sense of the new expression – is open to
question – to doubt – uncertain
our
understanding is what we propose –
it is what is
expressed
and what is
expressed is open – open to question – open to doubt –
is uncertain
7. ‘What is the criterion for
an expression’s being meant thus? A
question about the relationship between two linguistic expressions. Sometimes a
translation into another mode of representation.’
how an
expression is meant – and what the relationship is between two linguistic expressions
– is open to question
in practice –
decisions on the meaning of an
expression and the relationship between linguistic expressions – get made by
those involved in the question
these
decisions are what we proceed with –
and logically
speaking – we proceed – in uncertainty
8. ‘Must I understand a sentence to be able to
act on it? If “to understand a sentence”
means somehow or other to act on it, then understanding cannot be a
precondition for our acting on it. – What goes on when I suddenly understand
someone else? There are many
possibilities here.’
‘Must I understand a
sentence to be able to act on it?’
when you question – when
you doubt – you act on the sentence
any understanding is
uncertain – open to question
‘What goes on when I suddenly
understand someone else?’ –
in a logical sense what
happens is – you decide on or adopt an interpretation of what the other
proposes –
and there can be any number
of proposals advanced to explain this
9. ‘Isn’t there a gap
between an order and its application? “I understand it but only because I add
something to it, namely, the interpretation.” – But if one were to say “any sentence still stands
in need of an interpretation”, that would mean, no sentence can be understood
without a rider.’
correct –
and this means just that our understanding is never
complete –
logically speaking – our understanding is always
open to question
we operate in propositional uncertainty
10. ‘ “Understanding a
word” – being able to apply it. –“when
I said ‘I can play chess’ I really could.” How did I know that I could? My
answer will show in what way I use the word “can”.
Being able is a state. “To describe a state” can mean
various things. “After all I can’t have the whole mode of application of a word
in my head all at once.”’
‘ “Understanding a word” – being able to apply it’ –
yes – but any application
will involve question and doubt
‘“when I said ‘I can play
chess’ I really could” How did I know that I could? – My answer will show in what
way I use the word ‘can’ ’ –
‘how did I know I could?’ –
your knowledge is what you
propose
‘My answer will show in
what way I use the word ‘can’ ’ –
what will be ‘shown’ – is
your use of the word –
but what that amounts to
will be open to question
‘Being able is a state – to describe a state can mean
various things after all I can’t have the whole mode of application of a word
in my head all at once’ –
yes – but if you proceed
logically regarding the application of the word you will have in your head
question – doubt – uncertainty
11. ‘It is not a question
of an instantaneous grasping. –
When a man who knows the
game watches the game of chess, the experience he has when a move is made
usually differs from that of someone else watching without understanding the
game. But this experience is not the knowledge of the rules. – the
understanding seems like a background; like the ability to multiply.’
any so called
‘instantaneous grasping’ – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
and yes there are different
ways of understanding – any proposition – any propositional construction
12. ‘When do we understand
a sentence? – When we’ve uttered the whole of it? Or while uttering it?’
our understanding is
uncertain – when we’ve uttered the whole of a sentence – or while uttering it
13. ‘When someone
interprets, or understands, a sign in one sense or another, what he is doing is
taking a step in a calculus. – “Thought” sometimes means a process which may
accompany the utterance of a sentence and sometimes the sentence itself in the
system of language.’
when one interprets – one proposes
–
that you might interpret or
understand what is proposed in terms of a calculus
is to place the proposal in
a language-game setting
when one understands – one
engages with uncertainty
the proposition as
‘thought’? –
is an interpretation of the
proposal – a description of the proposal –
and yes – this view of the
proposition –
can itself be variously
understood
II
14. ‘Grammar as (e.g.) the
geometry of negation. We should like to say: “Negation has the property that
when it is doubled it yields an affirmation.” But that rule does not give a
further description of negation, it constitutes negation.’
‘Grammar as (e.g.) the
geometry of negation.’ –
grammar – is an account of
language use – a theory of language use
now if you
wish to represent the grammar of negation in terms of a different propositional
model – i.e. – geometry – I see no problem –
a
geometrical view of grammar – I imagine – might be something like a study of
the shapes involved in propositions that contain the negation sign
hard to see
the point of it – but it is possible –
perhaps
such a representation would function in an artistic context?
any
proposal is open – open to reformulation
We should like to say:
“Negation has the property that when it is doubled it yields an affirmation.”
ok this is a rule in the
negation game
‘But that rule does not
give a further description of negation, it constitutes negation.’
what it is – is a rule of
use –
and yes – it is a
representation of negation
nevertheless what
‘constitutes’ negation – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt –
is uncertain
15. ‘Geometry no more
speaks about cubes than logic does about negation.
It looks as if one could infer from the meaning of negation that
“~ ~p” means p.’
geometry
– is a propositional game –
what
it speaks about depends on what it is applied
to
negation
– is a logical / mathematical propositional action –
a
logical / mathematical game –
in
this game ‘~ ~p’ means p.
‘~ ~p’ means p – is a rule
of the negation game
if you play the negation
game – you play in accordance with its rules
to
infer is to perform a propositional action –
it
is the action of going from one proposition to another –
‘inference’
is a description of this action
in
so far as this is what occurs in a propositional game –
the
descriptions ‘inference’ or ‘infer’ – can have a place
16. ‘What does it mean to
say that the “is” in “The rose is red” has a different meaning from the “is” in
“twice two is four”? Here we have one word but as it were different meaning-bodies with a single end
surface: different possibilities of constructing sentences. The comparison of
the glass cubes. The rule for the arrangement of the red sides contains
possibilities, i.e. the geometry of the cube. The cube can also serve as a
notation for the rule if it belongs to a system of propositions.’
one word with different
‘meaning-bodies’ – different applications?
the logic of it is that any
word is open to question – and therefore – different applications – different
uses – different practices
and no explanation of
practice is ever complete
any ‘system of rules’ – is
epistemologically unstable –
hence possibility
and
yes – the cube is a proposal – and could well be
interpreted as a rule – used as a rule – in a propositional system
any
proposal – in any form – is open to question – open to interpretation
17. ‘ “The grammatical
possibilities of the negation-sign”. The T-F notation can illustrate the
meaning of “not”. The written symbol becomes a
sign for negation only by the way it works
– the way it is used in the game.’
the
grammatical possibilities of the negation sign – are the possibilities of its
use –
the
T-F notation can illustrate a use – a meaning of ‘not’
yes – the way it is used in
the game – illustrates its
meaning in the game –
and by ‘game’ we mean
– a rule governed propositional action
18. ‘If we derive
geometrical propositions from a drawing or a model, then the model has the role
of a sign in a game. We use the drawing of a cube again and again in different
contexts. It is this sign that we
take to be the cube in which the geometrical laws are already laid up.’
the sign used in different
contexts –
well it’s a question of
just how different you want to go here
if such a sign has a use in
e.g. a primitive culture – it will have a different explanation to ‘the cube in
which the geometrical signs are already laid up’
simply because such an
explanation is not part of that culture –
it might e.g. be explained
as a sign of the gods etc.
the issue is use of the
sign –
and we need to be logically
flexible here – if we are to make sense of its use –
we need to be open – open
to question – to doubt –
and to recognize that any
sign use – that is any propositional use – is logically speaking – uncertain
19. ‘My earlier concept of meaning originates in a primitive
philosophy of
language. – Augustine on the learning of language. He
describes a calculus of our language, only not everything that is in this
calculus.’
true enough –
and this observation will apply to any attempt to speak once
and for all of the nature of language –
any theory we have – as useful as it may be – in whatever
context it is applied –
is open to question – open to doubt –
uncertain
20. ‘As if words didn’t also have functions quite different
from the naming of tables, chairs, etc. Here is the origin of the bad
expression: a fact is a complex of objects.’
the proposal that ‘a fact is a complex of objects’ – may
well have function in a particular context
different perspectives will
bring different proposals to different propositional contexts
the question of meaning is
always open
21. ‘In a familiar language we experience different parts of
speech as different. It is only in a foreign language that we see clearly the
uniformity of words.’
yes – you experience uniformity where you can’t or don’t
differentiate
the experience of uniformity here – is the experience of
ignorance –
when you use a language – you question – you doubt – you
deal with its uncertainty
that is the experience of usage
22. ‘If I decided to use a new word “red”, how would it come
out that it took the place of the word “red”?’
if it does ‘comes out’ –
then I give a reason for the new usage
23. ‘The explanation of a word: what the explanation of its
meaning explains. (If on the other hand by “meaning” we mean a characteristic
sensation, then the explanation of meaning would be a cause.’
the explanation of a word’s meaning – will simply be a
restatement of the word –
an elaboration – an amplification – within a context of use
–
and a ‘context of use’
could involve any number of considerations
and any such ‘explanation’ – will be one of many possible
accounts of the word
such an such account could be the sensation explanation –
where it is proposed that meaning is a
cause – the word effect
even in such a case – what we have is a restatement of the
word – in a new or uncharacteristic way
any explanation is the word – as understood –
and any understanding is open to question – open to doubt –
any explanation is uncertain – is fragile
24. ‘Explanation can clear up misunderstandings. In
that case understanding is a correlate of explanation. – Definitions.
It seems as if other grammatical rules for a word
had to follow from its ostensive definition. But is this definition really
unambiguous? One must really understand a great deal of a language in order to
understand the definition.’
explanations clear up misunderstandings?
what we are dealing with is uncertainty – not
misunderstanding
‘misunderstanding’ – assumes before any
propositional action – that there is a true or correct understanding
an ‘explanation’ – is an underwriting of a
proposition – if you like an interpretation –
and an ‘explanation’ so called – as with any
proposal – any proposition –
is open to question – open to doubt
so too with any proposal for understanding –
our understanding – is uncertain –
and therefore logically speaking the idea of a
‘misunderstanding’ – has no place
understanding as a correlate of explanation?
yes – in that any explanation – any understanding –
is open to question
an ostensive definition – has no special logical
status –
as with any proposal – any proposition – it is open
to question –
open to doubt –
uncertain
25. ‘The words “shape”, “colour” in the definitions
determine the kind of use of the
word. The ostensive definition has a
different role in the grammar of each part of speech.’
the point of definition is to direct practise – to
direct understanding
the point of the ostensive definition is to enable
use
26. ‘So how does it come about that on the strength
of this definition we understand the word?
What’s the sign of someone’s understanding a game?
Can’t he learn a game by simply watching it being played? Learning and speaking
without explicit rules. We are always comparing language with a game according
to rules.’
a definition
is a proposal for understanding –
any definition – any proposal – is open to question
– open to doubt – logically speaking – is uncertain
our understanding – is uncertain
‘What’s the sign of someone’s understanding a
game?’
that they play it –
that’s the best we can say
‘Can’t he learn a game by simply watching it being
played?’
I would say so
‘Learning and speaking without explicit rules’?
yes of course –
rules are an
explanation of language use
‘We are always comparing language with a game
according to rules.’ –
I don’t know about that – perhaps some do
27. ‘The names I give to bodies, shapes, colours,
lengths have different grammars in each case. The meaning of a name is not the
thing we point to when we give an ostensive definition of the name.’
names are proposals –
proposals for propositional identification –
i.e. the proposal ‘red’ –
is different to the proposal ‘square’
a grammar is a theory of
use –
a propositional
underpinning of use –
i.e. an account of how
‘red’ is used – an account of how ‘square’ is used
‘meaning’ is a proposal
the meaning of a name – is
a proposal
pointing is a proposal –
a non-linguistic proposal
any proposal – is open to
question – open to doubt – is uncertain
28. ‘What constitutes the meaning of a word like
“perhaps”?
I know how it is used. The case is similar when
someone is explaining to me a calculation “that I don’t quite understand”.
“Now I know how to go on” How do I know that I know
how to go on?’
‘perhaps’ – indicates that one has considered a
proposal – and in consideration has an open mind as to whether to accept it or
not
‘I don’t quite understand’ – suggests a proposal
has been put – but one is not satisfied with one’s understanding
‘Now I know how to go on’ –
might be said after someone has considered various
proposals as to how to proceed – and has settled on one course of action
‘How do I know that I know how to go on?’ –
you make a decision to adopt a course of action
your decision – is open to question – open to doubt
–
and any reasons that you propose for your decision
are open to question – open to doubt –
your knowledge – is uncertain
29. ‘Is the meaning really only the use of the
word? Isn’t it the way this use meshes with our life?’
our life is propositional use
30. ‘The
words “fine”, “oh”, “perhaps” …can be the expression of a feeling. But I don’t
call that feeling the meaning of the word.
I can replace the sensation by intonation and
gestures.
I could also treat the word (e.g. “oh”) itself as a
gesture.’
yes –
we can relace the sensation with intonation and
gestures – and treat the word itself as a gesture –
still the question of meaning remains
and any response to that question –
will be open to question – open to doubt –
will be uncertain
31. ‘A language spoken in a uniform metre.
Relationship between tools in a toolbox.
“The meaning of a word: its role in the calculus of
language.” Imagine how we calculate with “red”. And then the word “oh’ – what
corresponds now to the calculus?’
‘a language spoken in a uniform meter’ – would be a
deviation from common usage –
and relative to common usage – might be regarded as
artificial
language as a collection of tools?
such a view of language may well suit certain
purposes
but let’s be clear – the tools in the toolbox
analogy – is just one representation of the nature of language –
“The meaning of a word: its role in the calculus of
language.” –
again this ‘calculus theory of language’ – will in
certain propositional contexts prove useful –
in other propositional contexts – it won’t
our theories of language – are no different to any
other proposal –
they are open to question – open to doubt –
uncertain
32. ‘Describing ball games. Perhaps one will be
unwilling to call some of them ball games; but is it clear where the boundary
is to be drawn here?
We consider language from one point of view only.
The explanation of the purpose or effect of a word
is not what we call the explanation of its meaning. It may be that if it is to
achieve its effect a particular word cannot be replaced by any other, just as
it may be that a gesture cannot be replaced by any other. – We only bother
about what’s called the explanation of meaning and not about meaning in any
other sense.’
is it clear where the boundary is to be drawn?
well wherever the boundary is drawn – it is open to
question – open to doubt –
logically speaking – any boundary proposal – and
indeed any proposal of clarity – is uncertain
‘We consider language from one point of view only.’
–
it might suit a particular purpose to consider
language from one point of view only –
but even in such a case – that point view – is open
to question
‘The explanation of the purpose or effect of a word
is not what we call the explanation of its meaning’’
what we call the ‘meaning of a word’ – or its
‘purpose’ – or ‘effect’ – is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
‘– We only bother about what’s called the
explanation of meaning and not about meaning in any other sense.’
the idea of meaning in any other sense – is what?
and any answer to this question – will be what?
an explanation of a meaning
33. ‘Aren’t our sentences parts of a mechanism? As
in a pianola? But suppose it is in bad condition? So it is not the effect but
the purpose that is the sense of the signs (the holes in the pianola role).
Their purpose within the mechanism.
We need an explanation that is part of the calculus.
“A symbol is something that produces this effect” –
How do I know that it is the one I meant?”
We could use a colour chart: and then our calculus
would have to get along with the visible colour sample.’
‘Aren’t our sentences parts of a mechanism?’
our sentences can
be viewed in this way – if it suits our purposes –
but just as equally they can be regarded – as not
parts of a mechanism
any view of our sentences is open to question –
open to doubt – is uncertain
‘As in a pianola? But suppose it is in bad
condition? So it is not the effect but the purpose that is the sense of the
signs (the holes in the pianola role). Their purpose within the mechanism.’
‘suppose it is in bad condition’ – really – who
decides this?
effect? – purpose? – the sense of the signs – is
uncertain –
yes – you can take the ‘effect’ view or the
‘purpose’ view – or whatever view –
it is all a question of where you are going and why
–
whatever view you take – it is open to question
‘We need an
explanation that is part of the calculus’
–
an explanation ‘that is part of the calculus’ – is
not an explanation of the calculus
“A symbol is something that produces this effect” –
How do I know that it is the one I meant?”
you don’t –
you propose that it is
‘We could use a colour chart: and then our calculus
would have to get along with the visible colour sample.’
a calculus for the calculus
34. ‘ “We could understand a penholder too, if we
had given it a meaning.” Does the understanding contain the whole system of its
application?
When I read a sentence with understanding something
happens: perhaps a picture comes into my mind. But what we call “understanding”
is related to countless things that happen before and after the reading of this sentence.
When I don’t understand a sentence – that can be
different things in different cases.
“understanding a word” – that is infinitely
various.’
“We could understand a penholder too, if we had
given it a meaning.” Does the understanding contain the whole system of its
application?
the understanding – if you want to put it that way
– is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
‘When I don’t understand a sentence – that can be
different things in different cases.’
when I don’t understand a sentence –
the sentence is open to question – open to doubt –
is uncertain
‘ “understanding a word” – that is infinitely
various.’
yes – exactly
35. ‘ “Understanding” is not the name of a single
process but of more or less interrelated processes against a background of the
actual use of a learnt language. –
We think that if I use the word understanding in
all these cases there must be some one thing that happens in all of them. Well,
the concept word certainly does show a kinship but this need not be the sharing
of a common property or constituent. The concept-word “game”, “By knowledge” we
mean these process, and the like, and similar ones”.’
‘understanding’ like any word – any proposal – is
open to question – open to doubt –
is uncertain
our knowledge is our propositional use
III
36. ‘If for our purposes we wish to regulate the
use of a word by definite rules, then alongside its fluctuating use we set a
different use. But this isn’t like the way physics gives a simplified
description of a natural phenomenon. It is not as if we were saying something
that would hold only of an ideal language.’
‘the way physics give a simplified description of a
natural language’ –
yes this is not setting a rule for use –
and ‘simplified’? – simplicity is in the eye of the
beholder
what we can say is that physics gives and alternative
description of a natural phenomenon
what we deal with is propositional reality –
‘ideal’ and ‘natural’ are really just categorizations that suit certain
purposes
the propositions of physics – as with any
proposition – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain
37. ‘We understand a genre-picture if we recognise
what the people in it are doing. If this recognition does not come easily,
there is a period of doubt followed by a familiar process of recognition. If on
the other hand we take it in on first glance it is difficult to say what the
understanding consists of. There is no one thing that happens that could be called
recognition.
If I want to say
“I understand it like that”
then “the like” stands for a
translation into a different expression. Or is it a sort of intransitive
understanding?’
yes we describe the experience as ‘recognition’ –
and just what ‘recognition’ amounts to – is open to
question
and just what ‘like that’ – means – will depend on
how ‘like that’ is described –
and any description of ‘like that’ – will be open
to question
‘a sort of intransitive understanding’?
if by that is meant – open to question – open to
doubt – uncertain
yes
38. ‘Forgetting the meaning of a word. Different
cases. The man feels, as he looks at blue objects, that the connection between
the word “blue” and the colour has been broken off. We might restore the
connection in various ways. The connection is not made by a single phenomenon,
but can manifest itself in various processes. Do I mean then that there is no
such thing as understanding but only manifestations of understanding? A
senseless question.’
it is not clear here whether the man in question
can apply the word ‘blue’ at all –
in the example given – he doesn’t associate the
word with the colour –
but does it have any significance for him?
his position is no different really to anyone
learning the accepted use of the word ‘blue’ – for the first time
we are told accepted use by others – and we move on
from there –
or we see how the word is used
use of any word – or any proposition – is open to
question – open to doubt
even when we have as it were mastered accepted use
– at every turn we face uncertainty
but here nothing is ‘broken off” – the traffic of
language is uncertainty
any account we give of understanding – is open to
question – open to doubt – is uncertain
39. ‘How does an ostensive definition work? Is it
put to work again every time the word is used? Definition as a part of the
calculus acts only by being applied.’
an ostensive definition is a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt – uncertain
and any proposal as to how it does or doesn’t work
– is likewise open to question
the proposal of definition – in or out of a
calculus – is an application – to that which is to be defined
40. ‘In what cases shall we say that the man
understands the word “blue”? In what circumstances will he be able to say it? or be able to say he understood it in the
past?
If he says “I picked the ball out by guesswork, I
didn’t understand the word”, ought we to believe him? “He can’t be wrong if he
says he didn’t understand the word”: a remark on the grammar of the statement
“I didn’t understand the word”.’
‘In what cases shall we say that the man
understands the word “blue’?
in those cases where he acts in a way that we recognize as understanding the word
‘blue’ – whatever that amounts to – at the time
‘In what circumstances will he be able to say it – or be able to say he understood it in the
past?’
he’ll say it when he says it – and yes – you can
propose an analysis of the circumstance or circumstances – if you like
‘If he says “I picked the ball out by guesswork, I
didn’t understand the word”, ought we to believe him?’
why not?
“He can’t be wrong if he says he didn’t understand
the word”: a remark on the grammar of the statement “I didn’t understand the
word”.
‘I didn’t understand the word’ – I imagine means –
I have no interpretation of it – no proposal for its use
and it does depend on just what ‘understanding’
means to him –
also others might question his claim – and propose
an understanding – and who knows he might change his mind?
in general though I think it makes sense to take
his claim of not understanding on face value –
still as with any claim – it is open to question –
open to doubt – it is uncertain
41. ‘We can understand a mental state, and
characterize it as a hypothetical
process. Comparison between the grammar of mental processes and the grammar of
brain process.
In certain circumstances both our picking out a red
object from others on demand and our being able to give the ostensive
definition of the word “red” are regarded as signs of understanding.
We aren’t interested here in the difference
thinking out aloud (or in writing) and thinking in our imagination.
What we call “understanding” is not the behaviour
that shows us the understanding, but a state of which this behaviour is a
sign.’
‘We can understand a mental state, and characterize
it as a hypothetical process.
Comparison between the grammar of mental processes and the grammar of brain
process.’ –
we propose the description ‘mental state’ –
and characterize it – that is propose in relation
to this description – the description – ‘hypothetical process’ –
‘mental processes’ and ‘brain process’?
different descriptions –
representing different perspectives –
that is to say – different descriptions – of that
which – without description – is unknown –
the point of any proposal is to make known
and any proposal – is open to question – open to
doubt – is uncertain
‘In certain circumstances both our picking out a
red object from others on demand and our being able to give the ostensive
definition of the word “red” are regarded as signs of understanding.’
yes
‘We aren’t interested here in the difference
between thinking out aloud (or in writing) and thinking in our imagination.’
a proposal is a proposal – whatever form it takes
‘What we call “understanding” is not the behaviour
that shows us the understanding, but a state of which this behaviour is a
sign.’
what we call ‘understanding’ – is open to question
– open to doubt – is uncertain
42. ‘We might call the recital of the rules on its
own a criterion of understanding, or alternatively tests of use on their own.
Or we might regard the recital of the rules as a symptom of the man’s being
able to do something other than recite the rules.
To understand = to let a proposition work on one.
When one remembers the meaning of a word, the
remembering is not the mental process that one imagines at first sight.
The psychological process of understanding is in
the same case as the arithmetical object Three.’
reciting rules?
it is all a question of context – and who proposes
what – in explanation
‘To understand = to let a proposition work on
one.’?
a proposition is one’s understanding – an
understanding is what one proposes
‘When one remembers the meaning of a word, the
remembering is not the mental process that one imagines at first sight.’
to remember – is to propose – to yourself – or
others
as to an explanation of this memory proposal –
any number of theories can be put forward –
and what theory you adopt – what proposal you adopt
– is really a question of what propositional context you are working in –
and what suits your purpose
‘The psychological process of understanding is in
the same case as the arithmetical object Three.’
yes – this ‘psychological process of understanding’
as with this ‘arithmetical object Three’ – is a proposal –
open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
43. ‘An explanation, a chart, is
first used by being looked up, then by being looked up in the head, and finally
as if it had never existed.
A rule as the cause or history
behind our present behaviour is of no interest to us. But a rule can be a
hypothesis, or can itself enter into the conduct of the game. If a disposition
is hypothesized in the player to give the list of rules on request, it is a
disposition analogous to a physiological one. In our study of symbolism there
is no foreground and background.’
the propositional reality we come to in any
endeavour – is never a void
we begin always in a propositional context of some
sort
a rule is an hypothesis in so far as it is held
open to question
a disposition is a proposal – a proposal to act in
some kind of way –
you can give a physiological explanation of
disposition
as for any symbol – what is relevant logically – is
that it is understood to be –
open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
44. ‘What
interests us in the sign is what is
embodied in the grammar of the sign.’
the grammar of a sign – is its proposed use
IV
45. ‘The ostensive definition of signs is not an
application of language, but part of the grammar: something like a rule for
translation from gesture into a word-language. –
what belongs to grammar are all the conditions
necessary for comparing the proposition with reality – all the conditions
necessary for its sense.’
ostensive definition – is a proposal – a
proposition – if you will – a non-verbal proposition
it is not a rule for translation – rather a
proposal
grammar as such is a proposal –
all
the conditions necessary’ – are unknown –
the conditions for the application of language –
are proposals
and these proposals – are open to question – open
to doubt
our reality is propositional
comparing propositions with reality?
is comparing propositions with – with propositions
grammar as a statement of how language works –
logically speaking –
the issue is never settled
46. ‘Does our language consist of primary signs
(gestures) and secondary signs (words)?
Obviously we would not be able to replace an
ordinary sentence by gestures.
“It is an accident that in order to define signs I
have to go outside the written and spoken signs?” In that case isn’t it strange
that I can do anything at all with signs?’
‘Does our language consist of primary signs
(gestures) and secondary signs (words)?
our language is propositional –
gestures and words are proposals – are propositions
‘Obviously we would not be able to replace an
ordinary sentence by gestures.’ –
to what extent you can do this is open to question
the deaf do a pretty good job with their sign
language – their gestures – as far as I can see –
“It is an accident that in order to define signs I
have to go outside the written and spoken signs?” In that case isn’t it strange
that I can do anything at all with signs?
proposals are given definition – by proposals –
there is no logical end to his action – though
there is always a contingent / pragmatic end to it
how this works – and why it works – is open to
question –
but this is our reality
47. ‘We say that a red label is the primary sign
for the colour red, and that the word is a
secondary sign. – But must a Frenchman have a red image present to his
mind when he understands my explanation “red = rouge”?’
no – he could simply accept the equation ‘red = rouge’
48. ‘Are the primary signs
incapable of being misinterpreted? Can one say they no longer need to be understood?’
how a sign is understood is how it is interpreted
logically speaking there is no misinterpretation –
there are only different interpretations
and any interpretation – is open to question – open
to doubt – is uncertain
our understanding is uncertain
49. ‘A colour chart might be arranged differently
or used differently, and yet the words mean the same colours as with us.
Can a green label be a sample of red?
Can it be said that when
someone is painting a certain shade of green he is copying the red of a label?
A sample is not used like a name.’
‘A colour chart might be
arranged differently or used differently, and yet the words mean the same
colours as with us.’
here we are playing a game
– a propositional game – where the rule is ‘the words mean the same colours as
with us’ –
‘Can a green label be a sample of red?’ –
yes – if an argument is put
to that effect
‘Can it be said that when
someone is painting a certain shade of green he is copying the red of a label?’
it would be an unusual
thing to say – but yes it could be said – and you would want to hear the
argument for why it is said
‘A sample is not used like a name’ –
this may be a statement of perceived common
practice –
however in an uncommon setting the opposite may be
true
50. ‘ “Copy” can mean
various things. Various methods of comparison.
We do not understand what
is meant by “this shade of colour is a copy of this note on the violin”. It
makes no sense to speak of a projection-method for association.’
‘“Copy” can mean various
things. Various methods of comparison.’
yes – any word – is a
proposal – open to interpretation
and yes we have devised
various methods of comparison
‘We do not understand what
is meant by “this shade of colour is a copy of this note on the violin”.’
we do not understand –
“this shade of colour is a copy of this note on a violin’ – in a literal
commonplace context
however in an artistic or
poetic context – it could well be understood by those involved
‘It makes no sense to speak
of a projection-method for association.’
the idea being – we
say – ‘you haven’t copied correctly’ – but not ‘you haven’t associated
correctly’
this may indeed be the case in common usage –
however it is conceivable that in a non-standard propositional practice – ‘you
haven’t associated correctly’ – would make perfect sense to those involved
51. ‘We can say that we
communicate by signs whether we use words or samples, but the game of acting in
accordance with words is different from the game of acting in accordance with
samples.’
we operate with
propositions –
it is logically irrelevant
what form a proposition takes –
be it in the form of words
or in the form of samples – or whatever
as to whether –
‘the game of acting in
accordance with words is different from the game of acting in accordance with
samples’ –
in a way it is an empirical
question –
but in any case – open to
question
52. ‘ “There must be some
sort of law for reading the chart. – Otherwise how would you know how
the table was to be used?” It is part of human nature to understand pointing
with the finger in the way we do.
The chart does not compel
me to use it always in the same way.’
‘There must be some sort of
law for reading the chart. – Otherwise how
would you know how the table was
to be used’
there may
be a proposal – for reading the chart –
if not
– and if no one puts one forward –
the chart
remains an unknown
‘human
nature’ – I take it – is anything that humans do –
understanding
– and understanding humans – is a matter of proposal –
and any
proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
‘The chart does not compel
me to use it always in the same way.’ –
a proposal – does not
‘compel’ – it proposes
53. ‘Is the word “red”
enough to enable one to look for something red? Does one need a memory image to
do so?
An order. Is the real order
“Do now what you remember doing then?”
If the colour sample
appears darker than I remember it being yesterday, I need not agree with my
memory.’
‘Is the word “red” enough
to enable one to look for something red?’
it might be – or it might
not be – it would depend on the circumstance
‘Does one need a memory
image to do so?’
‘a memory image’ is a
background proposal
does one need a background proposal to do this?
if you have no background proposal to work with
here – then you would need someone to give you are start – i.e. propose
‘something red’
‘An order. Is the real
order “Do now what you remember doing then?”’
an order is a propositional direction –
if you are to follow a propositional direction –
you need to be familiar with this propositional practice –
yes you will need to have some experience of it –
or be introduced to the propositional practise –
which means someone showing you the practice – the appropriate behaviour
‘If the colour sample
appears darker than I remember it being yesterday, I need not agree with my
memory.’
any sample / proposal – is open to question –
and any proposed action in relation to a sample /
proposal –
is open to question
54. ‘“Paint from memory the
colour of the door of your room” is no more unambiguous than “paint the green
you see on this chart.”
I see the colour of the
flower and recognize it.
Even if I say “no, this
colour is brighter than the one I saw there,” there is no process of comparing
two simultaneously given shades of colour.
Think of reading aloud from
a written test (or writing to dictation).’
“Paint from memory the
colour of the door of your room” is no more unambiguous than “paint the green
you see on this chart.”
either proposal – is open to question – open to
doubt – uncertain
‘I see the colour of the
flower and recognize it.’
if you say you recognize it
– you are saying you bring a proposal to it – you bring a description to it
‘Even if I say “no, this
colour is brighter than the one I saw there,” there is no process of comparing
two simultaneously given shades of colour.’
ok – so there is no simultaneity
here – and therefore – in so far as we make comparisons – simultaneity – is
irrelevant
and what of comparison?
well the fact is we compare
different things – different propositions –
comparison is the showing –
the proposing of – difference
‘Think of reading aloud
from a written test (or writing to dictation).’
it depends on what you are
doing here
if your business is
analysis – you might – as Wittgenstein does here – break the action up –
separate out the written sign and the sound –
this is only one way to
view the action
you can just as easily see
the action as a singular occurrence – an unanalyzed event
how any proposal is viewed
– how any action is viewed – is open to question
55. ‘ “Why do you choose this colour when given this order?” –
“Because this colour is opposite to the word ‘red’ in my chart.” In that case
there is no sense in this question:
“Why do you call ‘red’ the colour in the chart opposite the word ‘red’?”
The connection between
“language and reality” is made by definitions of words – which belong to
grammar.’
there is no mystery here – it’s a game –
a game of word and colour association
you play according to a rule – one given – or one
you make
in the example given the rule seems to be that a
word is to be associated with the colour opposite it in the chart
if there is no rule – there is no game
the connection between language and reality?
reality in the absence of proposal – is unknown
proposal – makes known
and any proposal put – is open to question – open
to doubt –
is uncertain
56. ‘A gesture language
used to communicate with people who have no word language in common with us. Do
we feel there too the need to go outside language to explain its signs?
The correlation between
objects and names is a part of the symbolism. It gives the wrong idea if you
say that the connection is a psychological one.’
our reality is propositional
–
and our proposals – our
propositions – take on many forms
we can and do ‘explain’ one
propositional form in terms of another – or others
we never leave the
propositional space
‘the correlation between
objects and names’?
‘object’ is a logical
proposal – a logical category or description
a ‘name’ is a place mark
for further proposal – further description
the relation here is
propositional
57. ‘Someone copies a
figure on the scale of 1 to 10. Is the understanding of the general rule of
such mapping contained in the process of copying?
Or was the process merely in agreement with
that rule, but also in agreement with other rules?’
copying can be approached –
can be done – on a scale of I to 10
this is one method for copying – one way of doing it –
not all copying is done
this way
was the process merely in
agreement with that rule, but also in agreement with other rules?
in this case the process is
the rule –
and yes copying can be done
in accordance with other rules –
is all copying rule
governed?
it can be so regarded
if you are not aware of any
rule for copying – and you make a copy –
is the copy rule-governed?
it really depends on how
the action is viewed – by whoever does the viewing
if they see it as
rule-governed – so be it
if they don’t – then they
don’t
58. ‘Even if my pencil
doesn’t always do justice to the model, my intention always does.’
my intention is always
undercut with uncertainty – as my pencil can show
59. ‘For our studies it can
never be essential that a symbolic phenomenon occurs in the mind and not on
paper.
An explanation of a sign
can replace the sign itself – this contrasts with casual explanation.’
‘where’ a proposal is put
will have implications for its accessibility
yes – an explanation is a
replacement proposal –
the point of which is to
facilitate the proposal’s utility
the idea of the causal
explanation as with any explanation –
is to do just this
60. ‘Reading. – Deriving a translation from the original
may also have a visible process.
Always what represents is
the system in which a sign is used.
If ‘mental’ processes can
be true or false, their descriptions must be able to as well.’
the ‘system’ – is an explanation of the sign –
there are any number of other possible explanations
what a sign represents
is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
‘mental processes’ – is a proposal – ‘their descriptions’
– proposals
if ‘mental processes’ is proposed – then whether
the proposal is true or false –
will depend on whether it is affirmed or denied by
those involved
same too with any propositional descriptions of
‘mental processes’–
any affirmation – or any denial of a proposal – is
open to question – open to doubt
a claim of truth or a claim of falsity –
does not remove a proposition from the realm of
uncertainty
61. ‘Every case of deriving
an action from a command is the same kind of thing as the written derivation of
a result.
“I write the number ‘16’
here because it says ‘x2’
there.”
It might appear that some
causality was operating here, but that would be a confusion between ‘reason’
and ‘cause’.’
an action from a command – is a proposal (physical
/ public) in response to a proposal (verbal)
the written derivation of a result – is the playing
of a propositional game
x2 = 16 is a propositional game –
that is to say – a rule
governed propositional action
I write x2 = 16
– if I play this game
‘causation’ and ‘reason’
are explanatory proposals
and any proposal – rule
governed or not – is open to interpretation
V
62. ‘ “That’s him” – that contains the whole problem
of representation.
I make a plan: I see myself
acting thus and so. “How do I know that it’s myself?” Or “How do I know that
the word ‘I’ stands for me?”
The delusion that in
thought the objects do what the proposition states about them.
“I meant the victor of Austerlitz” – the past tense, which looks as if it was
giving a description, is deceptive.’
“That’s him” – is a proposal –
obviously – open to
question – open to doubt – and logically speaking – uncertain
“How do I know that the
word ‘I’ stands for me?” –
in a final sense – you
don’t –
the matter is open to
question – if anyone should bother to
pursue it
the logical point here is
that I propose that ‘I’ stands for me – whatever that amounts to –
and given common language
use I can be confident – this proposal will be accepted by others
“I meant the victor of Austerlitz” – the past tense, which looks as if it was
giving a description, is deceptive.
‘I meant the victor of Austerlitz’ –
yes it’s meaning – it’s
logical structure can be questioned – and argument can follow
this is true of any
proposal – any proposition
the real issue here is
whether this proposal is understood in the context in which it is put
I don’t see any problem
there
63. ‘ “How does one think a proposition? How does thought use its
expression?”
Let’s compare belief with
the utterance of a sentence: the processes in the larynx etc. accompany the
spoken sentence which alone interests us – not as part of the mechanism, but as
part of the calculus.
We think we can describe
thought after the event because the delicate processes have been lost sight of.
What is the function of
thought? Its effect does not interest
us.’
How does one
think a proposition? How does thought use its expression?” –
yes – the proposition is
open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
‘Let’s compare belief with
the utterance of a sentence: the processes in the larynx etc. accompany the
spoken sentence which alone interests us – not as part of the mechanism, but as
part of the calculus.’
yes – here we have a very
interesting proposal …
‘We think we can describe
thought after the event because the delicate processes have been lost sight
of.’
… and the follow on
‘What is the function of
thought? Its effect does not interest
us.’
ok – the function of a proposal – in whatever form it
takes – is to make known
64. ‘But if thinking
consists only in writing and speaking, why shouldn’t a machine do it?
Could a machine be in pain?
It is a travesty of the
truth to say: thinking is an activity of our mind, as writing is an activity of
the hand.’
‘But if thinking consists
only in writing and speaking, why shouldn’t a machine do it?’ –
would such an output from a
machine – be regarded as proposal?
yes – why not?
‘Could a machine be in
pain?’ –
perhaps a malfunction of a
machine could be regard as the machine in pain?
it really depends on just
how you define ‘pain’
‘It is a travesty of the
truth to say: thinking is an activity of our mind, as writing is an activity of
the hand.’ –
there is no travesty here –
just descriptions
open to question – open to
doubt –
uncertain
65. ‘‘Thinking’ ‘Language’
are fluid concepts.
The expression “mental
process” is meant to distinguish ‘experience’ from ‘physical processes’; or
else we talk of ‘unconscious thoughts’ – of processes in a mind model; or else
the word “thought” is taken as synonymous with “sense of a sentence”.’
any proposal – any
proposition is open to question – open to doubt – so yes – fluid
the expression ‘mental
process’ – is a description – and yes it
could be meant to distinguish experience from physical process – or to refer to
unconscious thought – of processes in a mind model – or taken to be synonymous
with the sense of a sentence –
it could mean these things
– and whatever else is proposed
66. ‘The idea that one
language in contrast to others can have an order of words which corresponds to
the order of thinking.
It is, as it were, a
contamination of the sense that we express it in a particular language? Does it
impair the rigour and purity of the proposition 25 x 25 = 625 that it is
written down in a particular number system?
Thought can only be
something common or garden. But we are affected by this concept as we are by
that of the number one.’
correspondence is a
proposal
there is no contamination
of sense –
sense is open to question –
open to doubt – uncertain
‘Does it impair the rigour
and purity of the proposition 25 x 25 = 625 that it is written down in a
particular number system?’
rigour and purity –
rhetorical notions
‘Thought can only be
something common or garden. But we are affected by this concept as we are by
that of the number one.’
a thought is a proposal –
open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
the number one is a
proposal – open to question – open to
doubt – uncertain
proposal is common and
garden – whatever form it takes
67. ‘What does man think
for? There is no such thing as a
“thought-experiment”. I believe
that more boilers would explode if people did not calculate when making
boilers. Does it follow that there will in fact be fewer? The belief that fire will burn me is of the
same nature as the fear that it will burn me.’
‘What does man think for?’
–
whatever one proposes here
– whatever proposition is put – is open to question – open to doubt – is
uncertain
‘There
is no such thing as a “thought-experiment”’ –
any thought / proposal is
open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
to experiment is to explore
uncertainty
‘I believe that more
boilers would explode if people did not calculate when making boilers.’
this belief – any belief –
is open to question
the proposal that there
will be fewer explosions if people calculate when making boilers
‘Does it follow that there
will in fact be fewer?’ –
it may well follow if you construct your argument
deductively –
but this is just a language
game –
as to whether in fact there
will be fewer explosions –
it may turn out that way or
it may not –
this proposal as with any
other proposal – is uncertain
‘The belief that fire will
burn me is of the same nature as the fear that it will burn me.’
as a young magician I
learnt that if you pass a flame over your fingers – that is keep the flame
moving and keep your fingers still – or visa versa – hold the flame still and keep your fingers
moving – the flame will not burn you
you can try this at home
68. ‘My assumption that
this house won’t collapse may be the utterance of a sentence which is part of a
calculation. I do have reasons for it. What
counts as a reason for an assumption determines a calculus. – So is the
calculus something we adopt arbitrarily? No more so than the fear of fire.
As long as we remain in the
province of true-false games a change of grammar can only lead us from one game
to another, and never from something true to something false.’
‘So is the calculus
something we adopt arbitrarily? No more so than the fear of fire.’
we have language practices
– forms of language behaviour – which have use – which have currency –
these practices can and do
change with circumstances
as to fear of fire – it’s a
question of circumstance
‘As long as we remain in
the province of true-false games a change of grammar can only lead us from one
game to another, and never from something true to something false.’
the true-false dichotomy –
does not apply to games
you play a game – or you don’t –
a change of grammar – a
change of game – a change of play
VI
69. ‘What is a proposition?
– Do we have a single general concept of proposition?’
a proposition is a proposal
–
a proposal is open to
question – open to doubt – is uncertain
any conception of the
proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
70. ‘ “What happens when a new proposition is taken into the
language: what is the criterion for its being a proposition?”
In this respect the concept
of number is like the concept of proposition. On the other hand the concept of
cardinal number can be called a rigorously circumscribed concept, that is to
say, it’s a concept in a different sense of the word.’
a proposition is a proposal
–
what happens when a new
proposition is taken into the language – is that it is proposed – and each time it is used – it is proposed
what is the criterion for
it being a proposition?
that it is proposed
a concept is if you like a
back story for a proposition –
a way of talking about it
it is not that the concept
of number is like that of the concept
of a proposition –
numbers are
propositions
if it’s proposed – it’s a
proposition
the cardinal number – ‘a
rigorously circumscribed concept’?
the cardinal number is a
proposal – is a proposition
a proposal in number theory –
‘rigorously circumscribed’ –
is to say that in the practice of number theory –
this proposal –
is described as having certain characteristics and
functions
as the history of cardinals shows –
these characteristics and functions – the
descriptions –
are open to question – to interpretation –
open to exploration
71. ‘I posses the concept
of ‘language’ from the languages I have learnt. “But languages can expand”; if
‘expand’ makes sense here, I must now be able to specify how I imagine an
expansion.
No sign leads us beyond
itself.
Does every newly
constructed language broaden the concept of language? – comparison with the
concept of number.’
language is language use –
and any language use is
open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
it is this uncertainty that is the ground of any
change in usage
‘no sign leads beyond
itself’?
this is a very odd remark
to make –
the whole point of a sign
is that it signifies – and to signify is to point beyond –
to point to other signs –
a sign does not stand alone
– it does not function in a linguistic vacuum
a sign is a proposal – open
to question – open to doubt – uncertain
it is this uncertainty –
that exposes the possibilities of the sign –
the possibilities of
interpretation – of connection – of use
‘Does every newly
constructed language broaden the concept of language?’
language is the use of
signs –
can you get any broader
than that?
as to number –
the ground of mathematics
is uncertainty –
so really mathematical
discoveries –
should be no surprise
72. ‘The indeterminacy of
generality is not a logical indeterminacy.
The task of philosophy is
not to create an ideal language, but to clarify the use of existing language.
I’m allowed to use the word
“rule” without first tabulating the rules for the word. – If philosophy was
concerned with the concept of the calculus of all calculi, there would be such
a thing as meta philosophy. – But there is not.’
‘the indeterminacy of
generality is not a logical indeterminacy’?
a proposition – that
proposes a generality –
like any other proposition
– is open to question – open to doubt
what we are dealing with
here is logic – plain and simple
the logic of the
proposition – is the logic of uncertainty
‘the task of philosophy is
not to create an ideal language, but to clarify the use of existing language’?’
the task of philosophy is
open to question –
if an ‘ideal language’
suits a purpose – so be it
any such ‘language’ – as
with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
‘I’m allowed to use the
word “rule” without first tabulating the rules for the word. – If philosophy
was concerned with the concept of the calculus of all calculi, there would be
such a thing as meta philosophy. – But there is not.’
meta philosophy?
really all we are talking
about here is –
a proposition put – i.e. a
proposal – as to the ground or basis of calculi
any such proposition –
is open to question – open
to doubt – is uncertain
73. ‘Isn’t it on the
strength of a particular property, the property of being a rule, that we speak
of the rules of the game. – We use the word “rule” in contrast to “word”
“projection”, and some other words.’
‘Isn’t it on the strength
of the property of being a rule that we speak of the rules of the game’?
this is just to say – that
a rule is a rule –
this – ‘the property of
being a rule’ – is irrelevant rhetoric
the point being – ‘rule’ –
is not elucidated or advanced in any way by saying it is a rule –
‘the property of being a
rule’ – is a sham explanation of ‘rule’ –
and further I think it is
an attempt to give ‘rule’ – a foundation
– beyond question
yes – we may use the word
‘rule’ – instead of other terms – if we
believe ‘rule’ is more useful than other terms
74. ‘We learnt the meaning
of the word plant by examples. And if we disregard hypothetical dispositions,
these examples stand only for themselves. –
The grammatical place of
the word “game” “rule” etc is given by examples in rather the way in which the
place of a meeting is specified by saying that it will take place beside such and such a tree.’
we learnt the meaning of
the word plant – because a proposition is
put – ‘that is a plant’
yes – the proposition
stands only for itself – but as a proposition – is open to question – open to
doubt – what it stands for – what ‘itself’ is – is uncertain
the grammatical place of
the word ‘game’ ‘rule’ etc – is proposed
–
and as such is open to
question – open to doubt – is uncertain
75. ‘Meaning as something
that comes before our minds when we
hear a word.
“Show the children a game”.
The sentence “The Assyrians
knew various games” would strike us as curious since we couldn’t be certain
that we could give an example.’
‘Meaning as something that comes before our minds when we hear a
word.’ –
however you wish to explain
it – to dress it up – meaning is a proposal –
“Show the children a game”.
– is a propositional directive
‘The sentence “The
Assyrians knew various games” would strike us as curious since we couldn’t be
certain that we could give an example.’
and where we can propose
examples –
any such proposition – is
open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
76. ‘Examples of the use of
the word “wish”. Our aim is not to give a theory of wishing, which would have
to explain every case of wishing.
The use of the words
“proposition”, “language”, etc. has the haziness of the normal use of
concept-words in our language.’
any use of the word ‘wish –
as with any use of the words ‘proposition’ ‘language’ – in fact any use of any
word is open to question open to doubt – is uncertain
this ‘haziness’
Wittgenstein refers to is propositional reality
the reality of uncertainty
77. ‘The philosophy of
logic speaks of sentences and words in the sense in which we speak of them in
ordinary life.
(We are not justified in
having any more scruples about our language than the chess player has about
chess, namely none.)’
the key point here is that
sentences and words are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –
regardless of context –
that is the logical reality
the empirical reality – of
how things actually pan out in ‘the philosophy of logic’ or in ordinary life –
is another matter all together
chess is a rule governed
propositional action – a game –
we play games for relief
from the hard logical reality of question – doubt – and uncertainty
78. ‘Sounding like a
sentence. We don’t call everything ‘that sounds like a sentence’ a sentence. –
If we disregard sounding like a sentence do we still have a general concept of
proposition?
The example of a language
in which the order of the words in a sentence is the reverse of the present
one.’
a proposition is a proposal
– sentence or not –
in the example of a language
in which the order of words is the reverse to the present one – you have
another language to learn – and if there was a point to it – you might give it
a go
79. ‘The definition “A
Proposition is whatever can be true or false”. – The words “true” and “false”
are items in a particular notation for the truth-functions.
Does “ ‘p’ is true” state
anything about the sign ‘p’?’
the words ‘true’ and
‘false’ – are open to question – to doubt – they are uncertain
there is no reason why they
can’t be regarded as ‘items in a particular notation for truth-functions –
however this is only one of
many interpretations of the words
only one of many uses
‘Does “ ‘p’ is true” state
anything about the sign ‘p’?’ –
what “ ‘p’ is true” states
is that ‘p’ has been assented to – or
will be regarded as having been assented to
or another way of putting
it – ‘p’ is in play
80. ‘In the schema “ This
is how things stand” the “how things stand” is a handle for the
truth-functions.
A general propositional
form determines a proposition as part of a calculus.’
yes – the truth function
game – like any game runs on the premise – this is ‘how things stand’
however any concept in any
game is open to question – open to doubt
the truth function calculus
is a product of questioning and doubt –
however if you play the game – you play it as
prescribed –
you play it on the premise ‘this is how things stand’ –
there is no room for
questioning and doubt in the game as
played
a proposition is a proposal
– and a proposal can take any number of different forms
devising a calculus is
devising a game –
a propositional game
81. ‘The rules that say
such and such a combination of words yields no sense.
“How do I know that red
can’t be cut into bits?” is not a question. I must begin with the distinction
between sense and nonsense. I can’t give it foundations.’
‘The rules that say such
and such a combination of words yields no sense.’ –
such rules simply specify
what words are not in play in a word game
“How do I know that red can’t
be cut into bits?” is not a question. I must begin with the distinction between
sense and nonsense. I can’t give it foundations.’
sense and nonsense? – or is
it a question of dealing with different contexts of use?
I can well imagine an
artist using the expression ‘cutting red into bits’
any so called ‘foundation’
– is propositional – is a proposition –
a proposition is a proposal
– open to question – open to doubt –
is uncertain
82. ‘ “How must we make the
grammatical rules for words if they are to give a sentence sense?”
A proposition shows the
possibility of the state of affairs it describes. “Possible” here means the
same as “conceivable”; representable in a particular system of propositions.
The proposition “I can
imagine such and such a colour transition connects the linguistic
representation with another form of representation; it is a proposition of
grammar.’
“How must we make the
grammatical rules for words if they are to give a sentence sense?”
logically speaking – this
is putting the cart before the horse
grammatical rules are an
explanation – interpretation – or underwriting of propositional use
sense is always open to
question – rules are the decision to give a direction to sense – to use
‘A proposition shows the
possibility of the state of affairs it describes. “Possible” here means the
same as “conceivable”; representable in a particular system of propositions.’
a proposition is a proposal
– open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
as such a proposition is an
exploration of possibility –
a proposition is a logical
focus – for conceivability
representable in a
particular system of propositions?
a ‘system’ – is a proposal
for propositional organization
and yes – you can propose
that your proposition has a place in an organized propositional setting –
and you will – if it suits
your purpose
‘The proposition “I can
imagine such and such a colour transition connects the linguistic
representation with another form of representation”; it is a proposition of
grammar.’
the proposition as a
proposal of the relation between different propositional expressions or forms –
yes a proposition of
grammar – if you like
83. ‘It looks as if we
could say: Word-language allows of senseless combinations of words, but the language
of imagining does not allow us to imagine anything senseless.
“Can you imagine it being
otherwise?” How strange that one should be able to say that such and such a
state of affairs is inconceivable!’
any proposition I put – be
it in word-language or in my imagination – makes sense
that another might query
the sense of my propositions – is just as it is –
any proposal – any
proposition is open to question to doubt – is uncertain –
but I don’t go around
proposing senseless propositions – and neither I think do you
if I am presented with a
combination of words that I cannot make sense of – so be it
I presume it makes sense to
someone – in some propositional context
as to ‘inconceivable’? –
this is to ask – what
cannot be proposed?
and the answer is
straightforward – it doesn’t matter – we only deal with what is proposed –
not – with what is not
proposed
‘it’s the proposal –
stupid’
84. ‘The role of a
proposition in the calculus is its sense.
It is only in language that
something is a proposition. To understand a proposition is to understand a
language.’
a calculus is a language
game
a proposition in a calculus
is a move in the game
the rules of the calculus –
of the game –
determine the sense of the
proposition in the calculus – in the game
a proposition in a calculus
can be put to question
if you question a
proposition in a calculus you are not doing
the calculus –
you are rather engaged in a
logical inquiry
you can either do the
calculus or question it –
but one is not the other
what is to count as a
proposal – as a proposition – is open to question – open to doubt
is uncertain
I for one have a broad view
– I say anything that is held open to question – open to doubt – is a proposal
– is a proposition
here I include – of course
language – but also anything that human beings create – and – I think – nature
itself –
to understand a proposition
– is to see that the proposition is a proposal –
open to question – open to
doubt – uncertain
VII
85. ‘Symbols appear to be
of their nature unsatisfied.
A proposition seems to
demand that reality be compared with it. “A proposition like a ruler laid against
reality.” ’
symbols are uncertain
our reality is
propositional
‘A proposition like a ruler
laid against reality.’ –
is a proposition laid
against a propositional reality
the propositional reality –
and the proposition laid against it –
open to question – open to
doubt – uncertain
86. ‘If you see the
expression of an expectation you see what is being expected.
It looks as if the ultimate
thing sought by an order had to remain unexpressed. – As if the sign was trying
to communicate with us.
A sign does its job only in
a grammatical system.’
‘If you see the expression
of an expectation you see what is being expected’ –
if you interpret what you
see as an ‘expectation’ – you see that it is being proposed
that something will occur
such a proposal is commonly
analyzed in psycho / physical terms
and this proposal as with
any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
‘It looks as if the
ultimate thing sought by an order had to remain unexpressed. – As if the sign
was trying to communicate with us.’ –
an order is a form of
proposal – what is unexpressed – is not there
a sign – a proposal – is
what we communicate with –
‘A sign does its job only
in a grammatical system.’ –
a sign is open to question
a grammatical system is a
propositional context for a sign
a sign may be understood in
terms of a grammatical system –
or it may be otherwise
understood
87. ‘It seems as if the
expectation and the fact satisfying the expectation fitted together somehow,
Solids and hollows. – Expectation is not related to its satisfaction in the
same way as hunger is related to its satisfaction.’
‘It seems as if the
expectation and the fact satisfying the expectation fitted together somehow,
Solids and hollows.’
the expectation / proposal
– and the outcome – are open to question – open to doubt –
uncertain
where it is proposed that
the outcome fits perfectly with the expectation / proposal – so be it
however that proposal is
open to question – to doubt – is uncertain
‘Expectation is not related
to its satisfaction in the same way as hunger is related to its satisfaction.’
the relationship of an
expectation / proposal to its satisfaction / proposal – is a relation of propositional uncertainty
satisfaction of hunger is
open to question
i.e. am I ‘satisfied’ if I
gave eaten the minimum quantity of food
that I regard as necessary – or am I
‘satisfied’ when I have eaten more than I need?
88. ‘The strange thing that
the event I expected isn’t distinct from the one I
expected. –
“The report was not so loud
as I had expected.”
“How can you say that the
red you see in front of you is the same as the one you imagined?” – One takes
the meaning of the word ‘red’ as being the sense of a proposition saying that
something is red.’
‘The strange thing that the
event I expected isn’t distinct from the one I expected.’
a piece of good luck?
however if you look at it carefully – there are
questions –
OK – what has happened has happened –
can you be sure that what happened was what you
expected?
or that you are not now shaping the event to fit
what you now think was your expectation?
can you check your expectation without prejudice?
“The report was not so loud
as I had expected.” –
fair enough – but can you
say with precision – how loud you expected it to be?
perhaps it actually was as
loud as you expected –
and it was just that you
weren’t in the right place at the right time – to hear it as you expected to
hear it?
these proposals – like any
other proposal – are questionable – are doubtable –
that is just the nature of
the proposal – of the proposition –
this is not to say that we
shouldn’t say what we say –
it is rather to caution
that it is wise to recognize the fallibility of what we say – what we propose –
and to be careful not to
get deluded into a false security
“How can you say that the
red you see in front of you is the same as the one you imagined?”
you can’t – but you probably will and that is OK –
so long as you understand that your proposal – is
open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
‘One takes the meaning of
the word ‘red’ as being the sense of a proposition saying that something is
red.’?
just what ‘red’ means – and
just what the sense of this proposition is –
is on the face of it – very
unclear –
what is it that is red? –
and in what context is the proposition put?
‘something is red’ –
this proposal is basically
bare – it needs clothes –
however quite apart from
the fact that it is wanting –
meaning and sense – and any
supposed relation between the two –
are all matters open to
question – open to doubt – uncertain
if we are deal with
propositions logically –
we have to embrace
uncertainty –
otherwise the reality we
create and operate in –
is delusional
89. ‘A red patch looks
different from one that is not red. But it would be odd to say “a red patch
looks different when it is there from when it isn’t there”. Or “How do you know
that you are expecting a red patch?”
’
the proposal of red patch –
is different to the proposal of one that is not red
in propositional reality we
only deal with what is proposed – not – with what is not proposed
I might expect an outcome –
i.e. a red patch –
but as soon as I give my
expectation any thought –
it is clear that I cannot
be certain of any outcome
my expectation is a
proposal –
open to question – open to
doubt – uncertain
‘Or “How do you know that
you are expecting a red patch?” ’ –
you know because you propose that a red patch will appear
our knowledge is what we
propose
90. ‘How can I expect the
event, when it isn’t there at all? – I can imagine a stag that is not there, in
this meadow, but not kill one that is not there. – It is not the expected thing
that is the fulfillment, but rather its coming about. It is difficult for us to
shake off this comparison: a man makes his appearance – an event makes its
appearance.’
‘How can I expect the
event, when it isn’t there at all?
if it was there – it
wouldn’t be expected –
if it was there – there
would be no reason to propose that it will be there
‘I can imagine a stag that
is not there, in this meadow, but not kill one that is not there’ –
I can imagine killing my
imagined stag
imagining a state of
affairs – is not proposing an actual state of affairs –
though St. Anselm – might
beg to differ
‘It is not the expected
thing that is the fulfillment, but rather its coming about’ –
you may not see the coming
about – or be aware of it – only the end result – which is what is expected
or you may expect the
coming about – as a prelude to the fulfillment – here your expectation – your
proposal – has two phases to it
‘It is difficult for us to
shake off this comparison: a man makes his appearance – an event makes its
appearance’
perhaps one was expected –
the other not – or both were expected – or neither were expected
disregarding expectation –
what’s the difference? –
something is there – that
wasn’t there – whatever it is
91. ‘A search for a
particular thing (e.g. my stick) is a particular kind of search, and differs
from a search for something else because of what one does (says, thinks) while
searching, not because of what one finds. – Contrast looking for the trisection
of the angle.’
yes – there are different
searches
always in any search – you
deal with uncertainty
the trisection of an angle
– is no straightforward matter –
open to question – to doubt
– uncertain
92. ‘The symptoms of
expectation are not the expression of expectation.
In the sentence “I expect
he is coming” is one using the words “he is coming” in a different sense from
the one they have in the assertion “he is coming”?
What makes it the
expectation precisely of him.
Various definitions of
“expecting a person X”.
It isn’t a latter
experience that decides what we are
expecting.
“Let us put the expression
of expectation in place of the expectation.” ’
‘The symptoms of
expectation are not the expression of expectation.’
the symptoms of an illness can be seen as an expression of an
illness
so too with an expectation
/ proposal
‘In the sentence “I expect
he is coming” is one using the words “he is coming” in a different sense from
the one they have in the assertion “he is coming”?’
‘I expect he is coming’ and
‘he is coming’ – are different
propositions
‘What makes it the
expectation precisely of him.’ –
‘him’ – functions as an
abbreviation for a more detailed description –
what makes it an
expectation of him – is the
descriptions (of him) – that I have in mind – which is to say – I propose to
myself
even when he appears – I
might well be taken aback – if he presents in a way I did not expect
I would then have to as it
were ‘rewrite’ my descriptions of him
and of course I could be
fooled by an imposter
so the matter is – at the
best of times – far from certain –
we take a punt – and run
with what we have
‘Various definitions of
“expecting a person X”.’ –
any way of defining what
expecting a person X amounts to – may well be useful – but it will have its
limitations – as any definition does –
it will be open to question
– open to doubt - uncertain
‘It isn’t a latter
experience that decides what we are
expecting.’
yes – we expect what we
expect now –
the latter experience – may
as it were – confirm the expectation that we had – or it may render it
fruitless
“Let us put the expression
of expectation in place of the expectation.”
an expectation whether
publicly expressed or kept private – is a proposal
an expressed expectation has the advantage of being accessible to
others
93. ‘Expectation is
preparatory behaviour.
“Expectation is a thought”
If hunger is called a wish it is a hypothesis that just that will
satisfy the wish.
In “I have been expecting
him all day” “expect” does not mean a persistent condition.’
expectation
is proposal
‘If hunger is called a wish it is a hypothesis that just that will
satisfy the wish’?
well whether a wish or not
(perhaps better described as an appetite?) – yes an hypothesis –
open to question – open to
doubt – uncertain
‘In “I have been expecting
him all day” “expect” does not mean a persistent condition’?
‘expect’ – is a proposal –
it is not likely that over
a period of time – the only thing ‘in mind’ is the expectation –
however the proposal has
been put – as it were – in logical space –
its coming and going ‘in
mind’ – is a contingent matter –
which is to say – uncertain
94. ‘When I expect someone,
– what happens?
What does the process of wanting
to eat an apple consist in?’
‘When I
expect someone, – what happens?’ –
I put a
proposal – that is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
‘What does the process of
wanting to eat an apple consist in?’ –
what is
it to want – anything?
is there
a process to wanting?
look it’s
really a question of just how you define – understand – ‘wanting’ –
and
whatever you propose here – will be open to question – open to doubt – will be
uncertain
95. ‘Intention and
intentionality. –
“The thought that p is the
case doesn’t presuppose that it is the case: yet I can’t think that something
is red if the colour red does not exist.” Here we mean the existence of a red
sample as part of our language.’
‘p’ – is
the case – if ‘p’ is proposed
I can
imagine that an artist – or even a physicist could propose a colour – that has
not been previously described
‘red’ is
a word in our language – a proposal – that has application
and – as
with any other word –
is open
to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
96. ‘It is beginning to
look as if intention would be never recognized as intention from the outside. But the point is that one has to read
off from a thought that is the thought that such and such is the case.’
‘It is beginning to look as
if intention would be never recognized as intention
from the outside.’
we interpret what is put to
us – and give it explanation –
that we speak of intention
– has to do with how we explain what is put to us
intention is an explanatory
proposal
‘But the point is that one
has to read off from a thought that is the thought that such and such is the
case.’ –
what one ‘reads off’ is
what is put to – what is proposed – to one
‘thought’ is an explanation
of – a proposal
from a proposal – that it
is a proposal that such and such is the case
from a proposal – that p –
yes
97. ‘This is connected with
the question whether a machine could think. This is like when we say: “The will
can’t be a phenomenon, for whatever phenomenon you take is something that simply happens, not something we do.”
But there is no doubt that you also have experiences when you move your arm
voluntarily, although the phenomena of doing are indeed different from the
phenomena of observing. But there are very different cases here.’
‘This is connected with the
question whether a machine could think’?
the proposition – the
proposal – is that which is put –
I think there is an
argument for saying that a machine can propose
what we deal with logically speaking is propositions – that which is proposed –
how you explain the origin
of the proposal – what account you give of how it came about – i.e. man or
machine – is logically irrelevant –
‘This is
like when we say: “The will can’t be a phenomenon, for whatever phenomenon you
take is something that simply happens,
not something we do’
the
logical issue is the proposal –
what we propose – or what is proposed to us
‘But there is no doubt that
you also have experiences when you move your arm voluntarily, although the
phenomena of doing are indeed different from the phenomena of observing. But
there are very different cases here’
ok – you move your arm –
and you described this as ‘voluntary’
the issue is not doing or
observing – it is proposing –
how you describe – doing or
observing
and logically speaking –
any description you propose –
is open to question – open
to doubt – is uncertain
98. ‘The intention seems to
interpret, to give final interpretation.
Imagine an ‘abstract’
sign-language translated into an unambiguous picture language. Here there seems
to be no further possibilities of interpretation. – We might say we didn’t
enter into the sign-language – but did enter into the painted picture.
Examples: picture, cinema, dream.’
‘The intention seems to
interpret, to give final interpretation’?
one could say that the
point of proposing intention – is to ground a proposition –
and even to locate it’s
grounding
logically speaking though –
this is no more than propositional packaging –
with or without any
supposed grounding – a proposition is open to question – open to doubt – open
to interpretation
there is no final
interpretation
‘Imagine an ‘abstract’
sign-language translated into an unambiguous picture language’?
any translation is up for
questioning – so let’s drop this talk of the unambiguous
‘no further possibilities
of interpretation’? – this is just rubbish
‘We might say we didn’t
enter into the sign-language – but did enter into the painted picture.
Examples: picture, cinema, dream.’
yes – we might say
this
99. ‘What happens is not
that this symbol cannot be further interpreted, but: I do no interpreting.
I imagine N. No
interpretation accompanies this image; what gives the image its interpretation
is the path on which it lies.’
you
can continue to interpret – or you may decide to go with what you have
the
image is an interpretation of N – likely a given interpretation
and
the path on which it lies – as with the interpretation given – is open to
question – open to doubt – is uncertain
100. ‘We want to say:
“Meaning is essentially a mental process, not a process in dead matter.” – What
we are dissatisfied with here is the grammar of process, not the specific kind of process.’
meaning is a proposal –
open to question – open to doubt –
open to description –
interpretation –
uncertain
and as far as I know –
dead matter doesn’t
question – doubt – describe – interpret –
but I try and keep an open
mind
and as for ‘mental’ – and
‘mental process’ –
these are descriptions –
proposals to account for – among other things – ‘meaning’ –
that’s all – just proposals
yes – you’ll say – ‘I have
a mental life – and it’s real’ –
don’t wish to burst your
bubble –
but all we have there is a
proposal – common enough – yes –
universally endorsed? –
most likely –
just a proposal –
and if you put it to
critical attention – you will see –
it is indeed – open to
question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
101. ‘Doesn’t the system of
language provide me with a medium in which the proposition is no longer dead? –
“Even if the expression of the wish is the wish, still the whole language isn’t
present during this expression.” But that is not necessary.’
the idea here is that the
proposition standing alone – is in some sense dead?
the proposition – the
proposal – is live
relative to the proposition
– it’s ‘the whole language’ that is dead –
this ‘whole language’ – is
finally a theory – if you like – of the proposition – of the proposal –
and I would suggest in the
act of proposing – the act of expression – a background explanation
102. ‘In the gesture we
don’t see the real shadow of the fulfillment, the unambiguous shadow that
admits of no further interpretation.’
the gesture as with any
proposal – from a logical point of view – is open to question – to doubt – it’s
meaning and it’s interpretation – uncertain
103. ‘It is only
considering the linguistic manifestation of a wish that makes it appear that my
whish prefigures the fulfillment. – Because it is the wish that just that were
the case. It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet.’
the basic logic of it is
that a state of affairs is proposed –
that you may wish for – or
want – that state of affairs –
is logically uninteresting
should it come about –
any statement of it –
description of it –
is open to question – open
to doubt
104. ‘ “A proposition isn’t a mere series of
sounds, it’s something more.” Don’t I see a sentence as part of a system of
consequences.’
a proposition is a proposal
– open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
a mere series of sounds may
well be a proposition – i.e. modern jazz
a sentence can well be
viewed as part of a system of consequences – but it can also be viewed as not
105. ‘ “This queer thing,
thought.” – It strikes us as queer when we say that it connects objects in the
mind. – We are all ready to pass from it to reality. – How was it possible for
thought to deal with the very person himself?
Here I am being astonished by my own linguistic expression and momentarily
misunderstanding it.’
strange as it may sound –
‘thought’ is a proposal – ‘object’ – a proposal – ‘mind’ – a proposal
what we have here is the
‘interconnectedness’ of proposals – proposal in relation to proposals
it is not that we pass from
‘it’ – thought or mind – to reality –
we pass from proposal to
proposal
granted these proposals and
their interconnectedness is entrenched –
so entrenched that in common and indeed specialized parlance – they have been – they are – reified
perhaps that is just the
mark of success – as in useful propositional action
be that as it may – what we
deal with is proposals – propositions – open to question – open to doubt -
uncertain
‘How was it possible for
thought to deal with the very person himself?’
–
well it is the person
himself – who proposes
‘Here I am being astonished
by my own linguistic expression and momentarily misunderstanding it.’
there will be no misunderstanding here –
any ‘linguistic expression’
– is open to question – to doubt – is uncertain –
different understandings –
conflicting understandings – yes
any understanding – any
proposal –
is uncertain
106. ‘When I think of what
will happen tomorrow I am mentally
already in the future.” – Similarly people think that endless series if
cardinal numbers is somehow before our mind’s eye, whenever we can use that
expression significantly.
A thought experiment is
like a drawing of an experiment that is not carried out.’
when I think of what will
happen tomorrow – what I do is propose
a future specific state of affairs
as to an endless series of
cardinal numbers – I propose a mathematical game
yes – a thought experiment
is a detailed proposal for an experiment
107. ‘We said “one cannot
recognize intention as intention from the outside” – i.e. that it is not
something that happens, or happens to us, but something we do. It is almost as
if we said: we cannot see ourselves going to a place, because it is we who are
doing the going. One does have a particular experience if one is doing the
going oneself.’
‘We said “one cannot
recognize intention as intention from the outside” – i.e. that it is not
something that happens, or happens to us, but something we do.’ –
if you propose intention – you recognize it
simple as
that – no great mystery
however
your proposal of intention – and thus your recognition of it –
is open
to question – to doubt – is uncertain
‘It is almost as if we
said: we cannot see ourselves going to a place, because it is we who are doing
the going. One does have a particular experience if one is doing the going oneself.’
–
you cannot see – because
you are doing the going?
of course you see what you
are doing – at the very least you have proposed to go somewhere
yes – ‘your particular
experience’ – that is your particular proposal as to what you are doing
may well be different to a
proposal put by someone observing you – their particular proposal
VIII
109. ‘A description of
language must achieve the same result as language itself.
Suppose some says that one
can infer from a proposition the fact that verifies it. What can one infer from
a proposition apart from itself?
The shadowy anticipation of
a fact consists in our being able already to think that that very thing will happen which hasn’t yet happen.’
‘A description of language
must achieve the same result as language itself.’ –
the description of a
language – as with the language itself – is open to question – open to doubt – is
uncertain
‘must achieve the same
result as language itself’?
what result is that?
in answer to this question
there will be any number of proposals –
all of which will be open
to question – open to doubt –- uncertain
‘Suppose some says that one
can infer from a proposition the fact that verifies it.’
inference is a
propositional action – propositions lead to propositions –
verification when all is
said and done – is an argument for the acceptance or affirmation of a proposal
–
and yes a ‘fact’ – is the
proposal that gets the stamp of approval
the proposal – the
inference – the verification – the fact – all proposals –
open to question – open to
doubt – uncertain
‘What can one infer from a
proposition apart from itself?’ –
this is
confusing restatement with inference
an
inference – as distinct from a restatement – leads from one proposition to
another
‘The shadowy anticipation
of a fact consists in our being able already to think that that very thing will happen which hasn’t yet happen.’
yes – we speculate –
the proposition – logically
speaking – is a speculation –
open to question – open to
doubt – uncertain
110. ‘However many steps I
insert between the thought and its application, each intermediate step always
follows the previous one without any intermediate link, and so too the
application follows the last intermediate step. – We can’t cross the bridge to the
execution (of an order) until we are there.’
if there is a connection
between a proposition described as a thought – and a proposition described as
its application
the connection is
propositional –
that is you put forward a
proposal relating the two descriptions –
you can’t cross the bridge
until you propose the bridge –
and if you have a mind to
you can ‘insert’ proposals between the two –
that is to say further
describe or explain the relationship
and yes you can describe the application proposal
as following ‘the last intermediate’ step / proposal –
any number of ways of
looking at a propositional relation are possible –
it’s just a question of
what you are doing and why
however there is no
necessity in any of this –
any description – and any
proposal relating descriptions – is open to question – to doubt –
we operate in propositional
contingency –
the ground of all
propositional action is uncertainty
111. ‘It is the calculus of thought that connects with
extra-mental reality. From expectation to fulfillment is a step in a
calculation.’
‘extra-mental reality’?
this is a proposal – a
proposition – a description – of reality –
the underlying or assumed
proposal describes reality in terms of mental and extra-mental –
and if you accept such a
description – you think in terms of reality being some combination of radically
different ontologies –
radically different
descriptions
let’s take a step back here
–
reality in the absence of any description is unknown –
we propose to make known –
and any description we
operate with can be accounted for – ‘explained’ – in terms of complex
propositional histories –
and philosophers have
developed these propositional histories
these complex descriptions
– like any proposal – are open to question – to doubt –
uncertain
nevertheless – for one
reason or another a description such as ‘extra –mental reality’ has a currency
– has use
‘the calculus of thought’ –
if you have reason to
describe your propositions – or a set of your propositions with the description
‘calculus of thought’ – all to the good
as to connecting ‘the
calculus of thought with extra-mental reality’ –
this a proposal – and how
it is argued will determine it’s fate –
the logical reality is –
the argument goes on
‘From expectation to
fulfillment is a step in a calculation’?
‘a step in a calculation’?
that is one way of seeing
it – of describing it – explaining it –
and in certain contexts –
it may be quite useful –
however what we are trying
to do here is to cover the unknown –
explain the relation
between two events if you like – expectation and fulfillment –
two proposals – two
descriptions –
in practice it becomes a
question of context – what proposals are seen to work in what contexts –
that is the way of things –
however let’s not get ahead
of ourselves – and take our proposals too seriously –
all we are dealing with is
propositions – descriptions – open to question – to doubt – in the end
uncertain –
you use what works for you
– where it works for you –
and regardless of any
propositional baggage you carry –
or might be expected to
carry – and indeed to unpack –
there is always a question
112. ‘We are as – it were –
surprised, not at anyone’s knowing the future, but at his being able to
prophesy at all (right or wrong).’
what we ‘know’ – is what we
propose –
and what we propose is open
to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
–
past present or future
IX
113. ‘Is the pictorial
character of thought an agreement with reality? In what sense can I say that a
proposition is a picture?’
reality
is propositional
‘agreement
with reality’ – is the proposal that a proposition agrees with – another
proposition – that is a proposal as to what reality is
‘the
pictorial character of thought’?
well here
again – a proposal as to the nature of thought –
is a
proposition a picture?
a
proposition is a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt – uncertain
if you
want to characterize the proposal as a picture – well I don’t know how far
you’ll get with that –
but so be
it –
the real
point here is that any ‘characterization’ – is a proposal – open to question –
open to doubt – uncertain
114. ‘The sense of a
proposition and the sense of a picture. The different grammar of the
expressions:
“This picture shows people
at a village inn.”
“This picture shows the
coronation of Napoleon.” ’
word-language – at least in
modern western culture – is the primary propositional form
the picture – like
word-language – is a propositional form –
in many indigenous
pre-written word cultures – the picture-proposition is central
in written Chinese and some
other Asian languages the characters are logograms –
and so in these languages
it can be argued that there is no distinction between the sense of a word and
the sense of a picture
a proposition is a proposal – that which is put – and that which is put forward for
consideration –
logically speaking a proposition – a proposal – is open to question – open to
interpretation –
what form it takes – be that of words – picture – music – dance – etc – is
logically irrelevant
what is relevant is that – in whatever form – the proposition
– is recognized as a proposal – open
to question – open to interpretation
“This picture shows people
at a village inn.”
“This picture shows the
coronation of Napoleon.”
yes – these proposals can
be given different ‘grammatical’ descriptions
any proposition can be
variously described
115. ‘A picture telling me
something will consist in my recognition in its objects in some sort of
characteristic arrangement. –
What does “this object is
familiar to me” mean?’
‘A picture telling me
something will consist in my recognition in its objects in some sort of
characteristic arrangement. –‘
a picture telling me
something?
what the picture tells me
is whatever I propose that the picture tells me
‘will consist in my
recognition in its objects in some sort of characteristic agreement’
perhaps – perhaps not –
but if I propose this – fair enough –
however this proposal as
with any – is open to question
‘What does “this object is
familiar to me” mean?’
what it
means is that I can describe it –
that is I
propose ‘it’ – whatever it might be – and further propose description of it
that’s
what it means –
and how
we describe this propositional action – this propositional activity – is open
to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
116. ‘ “I see what you
see.” I say that because I don’t want to give a name to what I see. – I want to
exclude from my consideration of familiarity everything that is
‘historical’. – The
multiplicity of familiarity is that of feeling at home in what I see.’
‘‘I see
what you see”. I say that because I don’t want to give a name to what I see’ –
ok – but
this is just being logically lazy
‘I want to exclude from my
consideration of familiarity everything that is
‘historical’.’
it all
depends on what kind of descriptions you use – for your ‘familiarity’ –
and the
extent to which you are prepared to look into them – to analyze them
if your
descriptions are not obviously ‘historical’ – and you don’t engage in any
historical analysis – you should be right – at least until someone puts your
proposals to question
look the
real thing is that trying to determine a proposition and it its provenance –
only
works if there are no questions – there is no doubt
that is
to say – you operate in a logical vacuum –
you are
best to run with what you have – and leave it open
‘feeling
at home in what I see’ –
is being
comfortable with my descriptions – with my proposals –
ok –
nothing wrong with taking it easy –
however
this comfort comes at a price
any
description – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt –
is
uncertain –
if you
deny this – and pretend some kind of certainty –
you live
in ignorance
117. ‘Understanding a genre
picture: don’t we recognize the painted people as people and the painted trees
as trees, etc.?
A picture of a human face
is no less familiar object than the human face itself. But there is no question
of recognition here.’
with ‘recognition’ – we are
talking about description –
we describe a picture of the human face as a ‘representation of the
human face’ –
and we describe a human face itself – as ‘a human face’
how we recognize – is how we describe
there is no necessity
behind any descriptive action –
however there are various
accounts – philosophical – scientific – of the basis or ground of different
descriptive paths
these accounts attempt to
‘explain’ how we describe – and why we describe the way we do
any such account will be
complex – a complex of proposals –
however these descriptions
– complex and entrenched as they may well be – are open to question – open to
doubt – uncertain
‘familiarity’ is to be
accounted for in terms of propositional use
we use those propositions that we have used and
that other people have used
to understand is to be logically active –
that is to hold our propositions open to question –
open to doubt –
to understand is to recognise propositional
uncertainty
118. ‘The false concept
that recognizing always consists in comparing two impressions with one another
. –
“We couldn’t use words at
all if we didn’t recognize them and the objects they denote.” Have we any sort
of check on this recognition?’
‘The
false concept that recognizing always consists in comparing two impressions
with one another. –‘
‘recognizing’
– is open to question
“We couldn’t use words at
all if we didn’t recognize them and the objects they denote.” Have we any sort
of check on this recognition?’ –
we use
words – propositions – language –
why this
is – how it is – is open to question – but it is what we do – we propose
‘the
objects they denote’ – are our descriptions – of what is before us
in the
absence of description – of any kind –
what we face is the unknown
our
proposals – make known
and our
knowledge here – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
‘Have we
any sort of check on this recognition?’
only the
checks we propose
119. ‘This shape I see is
not simply a shape, but it is one of
the shapes I know. – But it is not as if I were comparing the object with a
picture set beside it, but as if the object coincided
with the picture. I see only one thing not two.’
our descriptions are
complex –
the description ‘object’ –
may involve a number of other descriptions –
as too any description of
‘shape’
yes – there is focus of
‘one thing not two’ –
but that ‘one thing’ in the
absence of description – is unknown
description creates the
object – and its characteristics
any description is open to
question – to doubt – is uncertain
we create with and in
uncertainty –
the propositional reality
is ‘a moving feast’
what is stable is the
unknown
120. ‘ “This face has a
particular expression.” We perhaps look for words and feel that everyday
language is here to crude.’
yes – sometimes we really
don’t know what to say –
such experiences might
humble us –
and a dose of humility
every now and again is a good thing
also such an experience
might annoy us –
and if that annoyance leads
to a more concerted effort to face and deal with propositional uncertainty –
all to the good
121. ‘That a picture tells
me something consists in its own form and colours. Or it narrates something to
me: it uses words so to speak, and I am comparing the
picture with a combination of linguistic forms. – That a series of signs tells
me something isn’t constituted by its now making this impression on me. “It’s
only in a language that something is a proposition.” ’
‘That a picture tells me
something consists in its own form and colours.’?
yes – it is a
non-linguistic proposal – a non-linguistic proposition
‘…and I am comparing the
picture with a combination of linguistic forms’?
effectively we have a
linguistic description of another propositional form
‘That a series of signs
tells me something isn’t constituted by its now making this impression on me’
this series of signs is a
proposal – a proposition – in a non-linguistic form
I can describe its effect
in a linguistic proposal – a linguistic proposition
‘It’s only in a language
that something is a proposition’?
not so –
a proposition is a proposal – and a proposal can take any
number of forms
i.e. a proposal can be a
form of words – a painting – a piece of music – dance – a sculpture – a city
building – etc –
in fact anything that human
beings create is a proposal – is a proposition –
and as such open to
question – open to doubt – uncertain
122. ‘ ‘Language’ is
languages – Languages are systems.
It is units of language
that I call “propositions”.’
yes language – is languages
languages are systems?
well languages can be described as such –
but there are other
descriptions –
i.e. – language as the
ability to make audible – articulate – meaningful sound –
by the action of the vocal
organs –
or language as the words –
their pronunciation – and the methods of combining them that are used and
understood by a particular community –
etc. –
languages can be and are
‘systematized’ –
but language is still
whatever it is – with or without that description – or any other –
the point being – how you
describe language – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
language like any other
phenomenon – is – in the absence of description – unknown –
we describe to make known –
and we will have different
descriptions for different purposes –
there is no essential – no
definite description –
any description – is simply
a contingency that enables us – under the circumstances – to proceed –
‘It is units of language
that I call “propositions”?
a proposition is a proposal –
we are of course familiar
with the idea of the proposition – as a linguistic proposal –
but a proposal is not
necessarily linguistic
I call a proposition –
anything that human beings create – anything that is – that human beings propose
i.e. language – art –
science – technology – philosophy – religion – etc. – and the fruits of any of
these proposals –
the proposition is a proposal – that can take as many forms
as humans beings can produce –
our world is propositional
and any proposition – any
proposal – regardless of what form it takes – is open to question – open to
doubt – is uncertain
123. ‘Certainly, I read a
story and don’t give a hang about any system of language, any more than if it
was a story in pictures. Suppose we were to say at this point “something is a
picture only in a picture-language”?’
what
we deal with is proposals –
word
proposals – picture proposals – or proposals in other forms
‘language’
– any language – is a background theory of propositional
use
a
background proposal
124. ‘We might imagine a
language in whose use the impression made on us by the signs played no part.
What I call a “proposition”
is a position in the game of language.
Thinking is an activity,
like calculating.’
‘We might imagine a
language in whose use the impression made on us by the signs played no part’
the signs in a language –
will have an affect in any use of any language –
for if they did not – there
would be no use of language
‘What I call a
“proposition” is a position in the game of language.’
a proposition is a proposal
–
a proposal is open to
question – open to doubt – uncertain
it’s position in the game
of language – is logically irrelevant
‘Thinking is an activity,
like calculating.’
‘thinking’ is a proposal –
open to question
125. ‘A puzzle picture.
What does it amount to to say that after the solution the picture means
something to us, where it meant nothing before.’
the proposal (the puzzle
picture) – was given an interpretation –
before that – it was open
to question
126. ‘The impression is one
thing and the impression’s being determinate is another thing. The impression
of familiarity is perhaps the characteristics of the determinacy that every strong
impression has.’
yes an impression – an
effect – in the absence of description – is unknown
any ‘determination’ of an
impression is descriptive
and any description is open
to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –
familiarity –
to be familiar – is to
operate in a propositional context that one is used to –
familiarity is an affect of
propositional use –
it is non-critical
propositional behaviour
you are familiar with a
situation to the extent that you don’t question – that you don’t doubt – that
you don’t recognize or deal with its uncertainty
familiarity is prefaced on
acceptance –
its basis is in pragmatism
– not logic
127. ‘Can I think away the
impression of individual familiarity where it exists; and think it into a
situation where it does not? The difficulty is not a psychological one. We have not determined what that is to mean.
Can I look at a printed
English word and see it as if it I hadn’t learnt to read?
I can ascribe meaning to a
meaningless shape.’
‘Can I think away the
impression of individual familiarity where it exists; and think it into a
situation where it does not? The difficulty is not a psychological one. We have not determined what that is to mean.’ –
familiarity
is a matter of non-critical propositional use
if you question – what you
are familiar with – if you doubt it – you can see it in a new light
a new situation – is a new
proposal
behaviour is either logical
– or not –
that’s psychology
‘Can I look at a printed
English word and see it as if it I hadn’t learnt to read?’
not if you have just read
it –
however you might
investigate the word – look to its history and origin –
and in that way see it in a
new light
it is not that you can
begin at the beginning – before a word had meaning – as it were
if a word has use it has
meaning
but this is not to say that
it can’t be reinterpreted against a common usage –
looked at in a new light
‘I can ascribe meaning to a
meaningless shape’?
well a shape is a shape –
so in that respect – it’s not meaningless –
so you don’t here begin
with meaninglessness –
you begin with the
description ‘shape’
as to how you further
describe this shape –
well whatever you come up
with – will be open to question – to doubt – will be uncertain
you will work with whatever
proposal – whatever proposition or set of propositions –
suit your purpose
128. ‘We can read courage
into a face and say “now once more courage fits this face”.
This is related to “an
attributive adjective agrees with the subject”.
What do I do if I take a
smile now as a kind one, now as malicious? This is connected with the contrast
between saying and meaning.’
we read courage into a face
– and say ‘now courage fits the face’?
we use the description
‘courage’ – to describe a face
and anyone listening will
have some idea of what is being said – if they are familiar with the
description ‘courage’ –
but just what the speaker
means by the term ‘courage’ – and just what any listener understands it to mean
– would involve a great deal of further propositional activity –
it is quite possible that
at any point in the analysis – no one will agree exactly with another’s
definition
what we deal with in any
description – is uncertainty –
some might take from this
that we don’t communicate –
the fact is we do –
our communication is
uncertain –
that is the way of it –
and indeed the source of
its richness
‘an attributive adjective
agrees with the subject’?
if we decide that it does –
any propositional decision
– is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
‘What do I do if I take a
smile now as a kind one, now as malicious?’
I change my description –
for whatever reason
‘This is connected with the
contrast between saying and meaning.’?
when I say something – I
bring interpretation to what is proposed –
my interpretation is my
meaning
however any interpretation
– any meaning –
is open to question – open
to doubt – is uncertain
in practice we often have
to stop and think – re-examine our meaning –
put forward supplementary
proposals –
these too can be
reinterpreted –
logically speaking there is
no end to this
what brings interpretation
to a stop – what enables us to ‘settle on a meaning’ – so to speak –
is the need to get on with
it – to proceed – to act
we proceed – and we proceed
in uncertainty
129. ‘A friendly mouth, friendly eyes, the wagging
of a dog’s tail are primary symbols of friendliness: they are parts of the
phenomena that are called friendliness. If we want to imagine further
appearances as expressions of friendliness, we read these symbols into them. It
is not that I can imagine that this man’s face might change so that it looked
courageous, but that there is a quite definite way in which it can change into
a courageous face.
Think of the
multifariousness of what we call “language”: word-language, picture- language,
gesture-language, sound-language.’
yes – we propose a description of ‘friendliness’
‘a quite definite way in
which it can change into a courageous face’?
and yes – we describe the
face as having changed – and describe the changed face as ‘courageous’
as to ‘quite definite’ –
a description – any description – is open to
question – open to doubt – uncertain
there is no definite description
if you are ‘definite’ about your description –
you play the rhetorical game – not the logical game
the multifariousness of what we call language?
yes we use the description ‘language’ in any number
of contexts –
this is a fact of propositional usage
130. ‘ “ ‘This object is
familiar to me’ is like saying ‘this object is portrayed in my catalogue’.” We
are making the assumption that the picture in our catalogue is itself familiar.
The sheath in my mind as a
“form of imaging”. – The pattern is no longer presented as an object, which
means that it didn’t make sense to talk of a pattern at all.
“Familiarity: an object’s
fitting into a sheath” – that’s not quite the same as our comparing what is seen with a copy.
The question is “What do I recognize as what?” For to “recognize a thing as itself” is meaningless.’
familiarity – is a question
of use –
I am familiar with those
propositions and propositional constructs that I use or have used
‘the sheath in my mind’ –
an interesting poetic image –
which amounts to – regular propositional use –
propositional use mind you
that is comfortable –
that is to say that is not
put to the question – not made a subject of doubt
the proposition is open to
question – open to doubt – is uncertain
that is the logic of it
the practice of
propositional use though is more often than not – non-critical
we need to proceed – and in
practice we often proceed as if there is no question – no doubt –
this is pragmatism
its ground is the denial of
logic
propositional use reflects
both rational and non-rational behaviour –
‘familiarity’ is a symptom
of the latter
‘The pattern is no longer
presented as an object, which means that it didn’t make sense to talk of a
pattern at all’?
the idea here is that ‘a
pattern’ in my mental catalogue becomes the ‘sheath’ in my mind and is a ‘form
of imagining’ – or if you like a way of imagining –
and as such the pattern is
no longer an object – and no longer a pattern
this I think is taking the
poetic image of ‘a sheath in the mind’ – just a bit too far
yes – you may wish to
describe use in terms of the mind
but look this is just
unnecessarily dressing it up – to no logical advantage
all you end up with is
arcane imagery – which complicates the picture – where it doesn’t need to be
complicated
‘patterns of use’ – will do
the trick – if you feel the need for an adverb –
but really it’s just ‘use’
‘Familiarity: an object’s fitting into a sheath’?
as if this ‘sheath’ – this
propositional behaviour – is somehow or another stable
ignorance is the basis of
stability –
if you question and doubt
propositional practice – propositional behaviour – there gores the ‘sheath’
‘comparing what is seen with a copy’ –
yes – it is not the same
thing as fitting an object – and by ‘object’ we mean here a description – into a sheath –
the crucial difference is
that once you are involved in comparison – you are involved in critical
activity –
one description as against
another –
what is similar – what is
not?
what is familiar in either
– where and how do the two uses
coincide?
how do we ‘explain’ –
describe their relation?
questions of epistemology
and ontology – if not metaphysics
‘The question is “What do I recognize as what?” For to “recognize a thing as itself” is meaningless.’?
what do I recognize as
what?
what do I describe as what
– what description do I give to that which has been proposed – i.e. – that
which is already described in some fashion?
to recognize a thing as
itself ?
is simply to describe it as
you have already described it
might not be interesting –
but it is hardly meaningless
131. ‘The comparison
between memory and a notebook.
How did I read off from the
memory image that I stood thus at the window yesterday?
What made you so certain
when you spoke those words? Nothing; I was
certain.
How do I react
to a memory?’
‘The comparison between memory and a notebook’?
is the comparison between different
propositions –
the one described in terms of memory – the other in
terms of a physical object – the note book –
we have two propositions with different provenances
–
different back stories –
whatever the philosophical history of a proposition
–
whatever philosophical clothing it wears –
as a proposition – it is open to question – open to
doubt –
any comparison between the two – will at the very
least illustrate that there is no one way of approaching – of describing – our
experience – our reality
we have developed different propositional forms to
deal with a reality – that in the absence of proposal – is unknown
we approach the unknown with uncertainty – and in
so doing create and explore possibilities –
the result – a rich and fascinating human reality
‘How did I read off
from the memory image that I stood thus at the window yesterday?
it is not that ‘I read off from the memory image’ –
it might indeed seem that way – be often
represented that way – I may represent it to myself that way
logically it is the other way around –
there is the initial proposal – ‘I stood thus at the window yesterday’ –
I put forward the memory proposal – to account
for the initial proposal
‘What made you so certain
when you spoke those words? Nothing; I was
certain’?
a proposition is open to question – open to doubt –
is uncertain
the claim of certainty has no basis in logic
it’s basis is just plain ignorance – or it is a con
– a rhetorical con
does anyone seriously suggest that memory is a
repository of certainty?
‘How do I react to a memory?’
you can react logically
i.e. with common sense – and regard a
‘memory proposal’ – as open to question open to doubt – as uncertain –
or you can be ignorant and
not question
we do both
132. ‘Operating with
written signs and operating with “imagination pictures”.
An attitude to a picture
(to a thought) is what connects it with reality.’
we operate with propositions –
and they can be described variously – i.e. ‘written signs’
– ‘imagination pictures’ –
regardless of how they are
cashed out –
a proposition is open to
question – open to doubt – uncertain
any proposal – any
proposition – creates a reality –
any ‘attitude’ to what is
proposed – is itself a proposal –
the original proposition is
open to interpretation –
an attitude is an
interpretation –
and like the proposition –
the attitude – the secondary proposition – if you like –
is open to question – open
to doubt –
is uncertain
X
133. ‘Grammatical rules
determine a meaning and are not answerable to any meaning that they could
contradict.
When don’t I call cookery
rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary?
I don’t call an argument
good just because it has the consequences I want.
The rules of grammar are
arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement.’
‘Grammatical rules
determine a meaning and are not answerable to any meaning that they could
contradict’?
first up – meaning is never
finally determined – it is always open to question –
grammatical rules are
proposals – propositions –
open to question – open to
doubt
secondly – grammar is a theory of usage
that a so called ‘grammar’
– is an accepted theory of usage – only testifies to its usefulness –
a grammar is useful
especially in introducing players into the common language practice – and
furthermore keeping them in it
however useful or not – as
with any theory – it is open to question – open to doubt
thirdly – not all
meaningful usage conforms to a grammar
when you get down to it –
how much of speech or writing – which users regard as meaningful – is strictly
speaking grammatical?
and really how technical do
you want to get with any grammar – any account of usage?
grammar is not a ‘fixed’
set of rules – that usage conforms to –
rather it is an attempt to account for usage
‘When don’t I call cookery
rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary?’
there are no rules – if by
‘rules’ what you mean is propositions – that are not open to question –
any proposal – any
proposition – held not to be open to
question – open to doubt – is a prejudice –
that is a corruption of the
proposition – of propositional practice
cookery rules – are
methodological proposals – proposals that have been shown to work
however in cookery as in
anything else – there is as they say – more than one way to skin a cat
in any activity we face
methodological options –
we become creative when we
develop and explore these options
‘I don’t call an argument
good just because it has the consequences I want’?
any argument is open to
question – open to doubt – is uncertain
likewise – any consequences
we draw from an argument
what we call ‘good’ – is
open to question
‘The rules of grammar are
arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement’?
it is a question of language context –
if you are writing a book of prose you will most
likely have an eye to the standard grammatical practice of your culture
if you are having a natter
over the fence – maybe not
if you are writing poetry –
you will in your creative effort – perhaps even in an effort to create a new
language form – most likely enjoy breaking the so called ‘rules’ –
however regardless of language context – questions
can always be put – doubts raised
in any language context the real issue is not
arbitrariness – rather uncertainty
134. ‘Doesn’t grammar put
the primary colors together because there is a kind of similarity between them?
Or colours, anyway, in contrast to shapes or notes.
The rules of grammar cannot
be justified by shewing that their application makes a representation agree
with reality.
The analogy between grammar
and games.’
grammar is a proposal – to account for – to explain –
if you will – the logic of usage –
but as with any proposal –
open to question – to interpretation
reality is what is proposed
–
any proposal puts forward a
reality –
justification is rhetoric
grammar is a proposal – a
game is a proposal –
however there is a relevant
difference
propositional activity may
or may not be ‘grammatical’ – and yet still be functional
in a game you play
according to the rules – or there is no game
135. ‘Language considered
as part of a psychological mechanism.
I do not use “this is a
sign for sugar” in the same way as the sentence “if I press this button, I get
a piece of sugar”.’
language as a psychological
mechanism –
is a proposal – a theory
for understanding the nature of language –
one of many
‘this is a sign for sugar’
and ‘if I press this button, I get a piece of sugar’ –
will likely have different
uses
136. ‘Suppose we compare
grammar to a keyboard which I can use to direct a man by
pressing different
combinations of keys. What corresponds in this case to the grammar of language?
If the utterance of a
‘nonsensical’ combination of words has the effect that the other person stares
at me, I don’t on that account call it the order to stare.’
using a keyboard to direct
a man by pressing different combinations of keys – is a game
if the man follows the direction – and plays according
to the rules of the game
grammar is a theory of
usage
any theory of usage – is
open to question
‘nonsensical’ is an interpretation of a combination of words
the effect of any utterance
– like the utterance itself – will be open to question – open to interpretation
it could be interpreted as
an order to stare
there are comedians
137. ‘Language is not
defined for us as an arrangement fulfilling a definite purpose.’
there is no definite
purpose
language is not defined –
it defines
and any definition is open
to question –
open to doubt –
is uncertain
138. ‘Grammar consists in
conventions – say in a chart. This might be part of a mechanism. But it is
connection and not the effect that determines the meaning.
Can one speak of grammar in
the case where a language is taught to a person by mere drill?’
the ‘connection’ of grammar
to language – is that of proposal to proposal
you can see language as
presented in a theory of grammar –
but this is just one option
language can be viewed in
any number of ways –
grammar is just one
proposal –
as for meaning – the same
applies –
any ‘determination’ of
meaning – is open to question – to doubt
meaning is uncertain
‘Can one speak of grammar
in the case where a language is taught to a person by mere drill?’
I would think not –
but then the question – what
is being taught here by mere drill?
how could it be language
use?
‘mere drill’ teaches
ignorance
language use requires a
flexible intelligence –
and that ability is not
fostered by rote learning –
in fact learning by rote is
the complete antithesis to learning how to use
language –
learning how to use
language – is not learning mindless drill –
it is learning to deal with
uncertainty
139. ‘I do not scruple to
invent causal connections in the mechanism of language.
To invent a keyboard might
mean to invent something that had the desired effect; or else to devise new
forms which were similar to the old ones in various ways.
“It is always for living
beings that signs exist.” ’
‘inventing causal connections in the mechanism of
language’?
this ‘mechanism of language’ is itself an invention
– or should I say a proposal –
and yes this is what we do in the business of
explaining – and accounting for –
we invent – we propose – to suit our purposes –
whatever they may be
and the logical reality is that any ‘invention’ –
any proposal – any proposition –
be it in the form of language – or in some other
form – as in the example above – a keyboard –
is open to question – to doubt – is uncertain
it is really not as if there are old forms and new
forms – just different forms –
different forms for different purposes
‘It is
always for living beings that signs exist’?
we make signs – we propose
we make proposals –
propositions – basic and complex –
in order to describe –
that which in the absence
of our proposals –
is unknown
140. ‘Inventing a language
– inventing an instrument – inventing a game.
If we imagine a goal for
chess – say entertainment – then the rules are not arbitrary. So too for the
choice of a unit of measurement.
We can’t say “without
language we couldn’t communicate with one another”. The concept of language is
contained in the concept of communication.’
any invention is a proposal – is a proposition
if you play
chess – a rule governed game – you play according
to the rules –
if you don’t play according to the rules – you
don’t play chess
yes – you can question the rules – and the rules
are open to question – but questioning the rules – is not playing the game –
a goal – the goal of the game – in an objective
sense – will be a function of the rules of the game –
as for entertainment – that is subjective
as to a choice of a unit of measurement –
that will depend on what you are doing – and how
you want to go about it –
you will have options –
a choice will be made
your choice won’t be arbitrary – but it will be
uncertain –
‘We can’t say “without
language we couldn’t communicate with one another”. The concept of language is
contained in the concept of communication’?
the ground of communication
– is the proposal – is the proposition –
whatever form that takes –
the proposal – the
proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
communication is –
uncertain
141. ‘Philosophy is
philosophical problems. Their common element extends as far as the common
element in different regions of our language.
Something that at first
sight looks like a proposition and is not one. Something that looks like the
design for a steamroller and is not one.’
philosophy is no different to anything else –
how it is described – is open to question – open to
doubt – is uncertain
‘Something that at first
sight looks like a proposition and is not one’
any proposal is a proposition –
if it is not held open to
question – open to doubt – not regarded as uncertain –
it is held as a prejudice
prejudice is propositional
corruption
‘Something that at first sight looks like the
design for a steamroller and is not one’ –
the design for a steamroller – as
with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
if it is decided that the design
doesn’t work – the design will not be put into effect –
it will not be used
however any propositional
decision – if we are logical – is open to question – open to doubt
is uncertain
nevertheless decisions are made
142. ‘Are we willing to
call a series of independent signals “a language”?
Imagine a diary kept with
signals. Are explanations given so that the signals are connected to another
language?
A language consisting of
commands. We wouldn’t say that a series of such signals alone would enable me
to derive a picture of the movement of a man obeying them unless in addition to
the signal there is something that might be called a general rule for
translating into drawing.
The grammar explains the
meaning of the signs and thus makes the language pictorial.’
language interprets the world – or features of it
‘language’ – is a propositional complex
‘Are we willing to call a
series of independent signals “a language”?’
independent signals – could well be regarded as a
propositional complex –
that is to say – independent signals – could be
proposed as a way of interpreting the world or features of it
‘Imagine a diary kept with
signals. Are explanations given so that the signals are connected to another
language?’
any sign or signal – if it
is to be meaningful – will be interpreted – propositionally –
that is in terms of other
propositions
we are not talking of
different languages here – rather different propositions – propositional
complexes –
if you want to call
propositional complexes – different languages – OK – it’s neither here nor
there
the key thing is that any
proposal – any proposition – any propositional complex – is open to question –
open to doubt
any proposal – is uncertain
‘A language consisting of
commands. We wouldn’t say that a series of such signals alone would enable me
to derive a picture of the movement
of a man obeying them unless in addition to the signal there is something that
might be called a general rule for translating into drawing’?
‘A language consisting of
commands’ –
a language consisting
entirely of commands would be a dogmatist’s delight –
for in such a language –
there would be no place for questioning – for doubt – for uncertainty –
such a language would be
illogical – and entirely useless
‘We wouldn’t say that a
series of such signals alone would enable me to derive a picture of the movement
of a man obeying them unless in addition to the signal there is something that
might be called a general rule for translating into drawing’?’
a general rule for translating into drawing?
the rule here is what?
an explanation
of the translation
someone doing the drawing may not follow the rule –
and yet still draw the picture –
any rule here – is after the fact –
and is a proposal in relation to the fact of the
drawing – of the picture –
unless you are talking about a disciplined – rule
governed exercise – it’s irrelevant
‘The grammar explains the
meaning of the signs and thus makes the language pictorial’?
grammar – a theory of the
mechanics of language – a theory of how the signs work –
presumes meaning
does it explain
meaning?
it might be said to put the bones to meaning – and
show how the skeleton is constructed – even how it moves –
a proposal
to that effect
pictorial?
a picture is a representation –
what sign cannot be represented pictorially?
Appendix
1. Complex and Fact
‘The use of the words
‘fact’ and ‘act’ – ‘That was a noble act.’ – ‘But it never happened.’ –
It is natural to want to
use the word ‘act’ so that it only corresponds to a true proposition. So we don’t talk of an act that was never
performed. But the proposition
‘That was a noble act’ must
have a sense even if I am mistaken in thinking that what I call an act
occurred’?’
‘That was a noble act’ –
the sense of the
proposition is always a question of propositional context
e.g. – a teacher of
literature might well put such a proposal to his class in referring to a
character in a novel
in that context it would be
quite unremarkable –
and there would be no need
for the rider
‘Complex is not like fact.
For I can e.g., say of a complex that it moves from one place to another, but
not a fact.
But that this complex is
now situated here is a fact.’
a ‘complex’ – is a
description –
a way of describing –
certain proposals – certain propositions
a ‘fact’ is an accepted
proposal – an accepted proposition
accepted that is within a
propositional context
‘I call a flower, a house,
a constellation, complexes: moreover complexes of petals, bricks, stars etc.’
and such – ‘the complex’
descriptions – have their uses –
however the same proposal
i.e. ‘flower’ – ‘house’ – ‘constellation’ – can be described as a simple – and
seen in such a way
the issue is what use the
proposal is being put to
‘To say that a red circle
is composed of redness and circularity, or is a complex with these component
parts, is a misuse of the words and is misleading. (Frege was aware of this and
told me.)’
look – in an analytical
context – where a proposal is broken down to its components –
where’s the problem?
we are dealing firstly with
a proposal – a description – ‘the red circle’
this proposal – as with any
other – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
that it is then further
described in an analytical fashion – will make sense in a particular
propositional context
that such a description
doesn’t make sense in another propositional
context –
is par for the course
‘A chain, too, is composed
of its links, not of these and their spatial relations.
The fact that these links
are so concatenated, isn’t ‘composed’
of anything at all.
The root of these muddle is
the confusing use of the word ‘object’?’
the proposal ‘object’ – is
open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
taking a broad view –
‘object’ – is a muddle –
it is not that it is
‘confusing’ – it is rather that logically speaking ‘object’ –
is uncertain
‘The part is smaller than
the whole: applied to fact and component part (constituent), that would yield
an absurdity’
the part is smaller than
the whole?
if what is proposed – is
not described – or seen in terms of the ‘part and whole’ description –
then that description –
will be out of place
‘The schema:
thing-property. We say that actions have properties, like swiftness, or
goodness’
yes – ‘we say’ – we propose
–
the thing-property schema –
is a proposed explanation – in this case – of action
any proposal has its place
–
and any proposal is open to
question – to doubt – is uncertain
Appendix 2. Concept and
Object, Property and Substrate
‘When Frege and Russell talk of concept and object
they really mean property and thing; and here I am thinking of a spatial body
and its colour. Or one can say: concept and object are the same as predicate
and subject.’
the concept-object view of reality is a proposal –
the subject-predicate view – is a proposal
they are not the same –
they are proposals with different histories –
different ontologies – perhaps even different epistemologies –
they are different world views
and yes they can
be inter-related
‘The concept of the material point in physics is an
abstraction from the material objects of experience; in the same way the
subject-predicate form of logic is an abstraction from the subject-predicate
form of our languages.’
the ‘material point in physics’ proposal – function
as a propositional explanation of the proposal of the material object of
experience
and subject predicate proposal of logic functions
as a propositional explanation of the subject-predicate proposal of language –
(which is itself an explanatory proposal of natural language)
in both cases what we have is an initial proposal /
description – ‘material objects’ – and ‘the subject-predicate form of our
languages’
the material point – and subject-predicate form of
logic – are descriptions / accounts of the these initial proposals –
proposals in relation to the initial proposals
‘meta-descriptions’ or secondary descriptions – if
you like
the essential point to keep in mind here is that
any proposal – any physics – any logic – any description – is open to question
– to doubt – is uncertain
that a physics or a logic gains currency – becomes entrenched and has an ‘authoritative’
status is a function not of logic – rather it is a function of rhetoric –
argument and persuasion
‘The pure subject-predicate form is supposed to be
a e f(x), where “a” is the name of an
object. Now let us look for an application of this schema. The first things
that comes to mind as “names of objects” are the names of persons and of other
spatial objects (the Koh-i-Noor). Such names are given by ostensive definitions
(“thatis
called ‘N’”). Such a definition might be conceived as a rule substituting the
word “N” for a gesture pointing to the object, with proviso that the gesture
can always be used in place of the name……..’
a name identifies –
naming is recognized as an action of identification
–
this is the practise – the propositional practice
a name is a proposal – open to question – open to
doubt – uncertain
however the action of naming – is essentially
pragmatic –
we name in order to proceed – to get on with it
language – you might be tempted to say – is all
about motion
as to ostensive definition –
an ostensive definition may be used to identify the
object of a name –
and it is used to initiate one into the naming game
–
and even to activate the language-game itself
‘However, this isn’t the normal way of using a
name; it is an essential feature of the normal use that I can’t fall back on to
a sign of the gesture language in place of the name. That is to say, in the way
in which we use the name “N”, if N goes out of the room and latter a man comes
into the room it makes sense to ask whether this man is N, whether he is the
same man who left the room earlier. And the sentence “N has come back into the
room” only makes sense if I can decide the question. And its sense will vary
with the criterion for this being the object that I earlier called ‘N’.
Different kinds of criteria will make different rules hold for the sign ‘N’,
will make it a ‘name’ in a different
sense of the word. Thus the word ‘name’ and the corresponding word ‘object’ are
each headings to countless different lists of rules.’
if the context is such that it does make sense to
ask whether this man is N –
then gesture will be of no use
we are now well and truly in the language-game –
that is – into the business of question – and doubt
‘Thus the word ‘name’ and the corresponding word
‘object’ are each headings to countless different lists of rules.’
‘name’ and ‘object’ – are proposals –
yes open to question – open to doubt – thus –
uncertain
‘rules’ – are no more than proposals – propositions
–
open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
if they are held to be otherwise–
then they are propositions that have been corrupted
‘If we give names to spatial objects, our use of
such names depends on a criterion of identity which presupposes the
impenetrability of bodies and the continuity of their movement. So if I could
treat two bodies A and B as I can treat shadows on the wall,
making two into one and one into two again, it
would be senseless to ask which of the two after the division is A and which is
B, unless I go on to introduce a totally new criterion of identity e.g. the
direction of their movements.’
what this illustrates is that naming is essentially
just tagging –
and the value of a name – a tag – will change with
the circumstances
identity – we do
identify
and we use names and signs to mark the
identification
any identification is open to question – open to
doubt –
identification is uncertain
criteria for identity – or criteria proposals – underwrite the act of identifying –
logically speaking this underwriting occurs after
the fact of identification
criteria of identity can be useful – e.g. in a
debate
or they may just be propositional dressing –
after the fact
‘So it doesn’t always make sense when presented
with a proposition “(Ex).fx” to ask “Which
xs satisfy f? “Which red circle a centimetre across is in the middle of this
square?” – One mustn’t confuse the question “which object satisfies f” with the
question “What sort of object …etc?”
The first question would have to be answered by a name, and so the answer would
have to be able to take the form “f(a)”; the question “what sort of ..?” is answered by “(Ex).fx.ox”. So it may be
senseless to ask “which red spot do you see?” and yet make sense to ask “what
kind of red spot do you see (a round one, a square one, etc.)?”’
we don’t begin with formal logic and then ask which
propositions satisfy it –
any formalization is a translation from it’s
non-formal presentation
such formal characterization of propositions may be
useful in certain contexts –
but the formalization – is just a rewrite proposal
– it determines nothing –
and as with any proposal – open to question – open
to doubt – uncertain
‘I would like to say: the old logic contains more
convention and physics than has been realized. If a noun is the name of a body, a verb is to denote a movement,
and an adjective to denote a property of a body, it is easy to see how much
that logic presupposes; and it is reasonable to conjecture that those original
presuppositions go still deeper into the application of the words, and the
logic of propositions.’
is it logic that presupposes language –
or is it language that presupposes logic?
really you can’t run it both ways – and claim you
have explained anything
this is the way to think about it –
we have proposals – propositions – that can take
different forms –
and those forms can be propositionally inter-related –
if by ‘logic’ – you mean a certain body of
propositions –
and if by physics you mean another body of
propositions –
you can put propositions that inter-relate the two
the key point to make is that the logical process
that underlies any propositional
action
is questioning and doubt
‘If a table is painted brown, then it easy to think
of the wood as bearer of the property brown and you can imagine what remains
the same as the colour changes. Even in the case of one particular circle which
appears now red, now blue. It is thus easy to imagine what is red, but difficult to imagine what is circular. What remains in this case if form and colour
alter? For position is part of the form and it is arbitrary for me to lay down
that the centre should stay fixed and the only changes in form be changes in
the radius.’
‘what remains in this case if form and colour
alter?’
what remains – is propositional uncertainty
‘We must once more adhere to ordinary language and
say a patch is circular’?’
‘a patch
is circular’?
‘patch’ is a proposal – a description –
if it is used – it will be used because it
functions in a propositional context –
any proposal – any description – can have a place –
can have function – it depends on context –
and any proposal – regardless of context – is open
to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
this ‘ordinary language argument’ – is just a con –
it is just another attempt to impose a standard of
use – where logically speaking – there just are no standards –
there is just use
– and however you describe it
who’s to say what is ‘ordinary’ – and does it
matter? –
in certain contexts ‘patch’ – may have a very
specialized use
‘ordinary’ and ‘specialized’ – and whatever other
label you want to apply – are descriptions
of language use –
which like the usage they describe are anything but
certain
‘If I point to a curve and say “That’s a circle”
then someone can object that if it were not a circle it would no longer be that. That is to say, what I mean by the
word “that” must be independent of what I assert about it.’
‘that’ – is a logical
space – for description –
‘that’ – is a token
for the unknown
‘that’ –
logically speaking – can be however you describe it –
whatever it is proposed to be
‘How are two circles of the same size
distinguished? This question makes it sound as if they are pretty nearly one
circle and only distinguished by a nicety.
In the technique of representations by equations
what is common is expressed by the form of the equation, and the difference by
the difference in the coordinates of the centres.
Couldn’t you then say, instead of “this is a
circle”, “This point is the centre of a circle”? For to be the centre of a
circle is the external property of the point.” ’
‘How are two circles of the same size
distinguished? This question makes it sound as if they are pretty nearly one
circle and only distinguished by a nicety.’
how are the two circles distinguished ?
spatial position
‘In the technique of representations by equations
what is common is expressed by the form of the equation, and the difference by
the difference in the coordinates of the centres.’
yes – spatial position
‘Couldn’t you then say, instead of “this is a
circle”, “This point is the centre of a circle”? For to be the centre of a
circle is the external property of the point.” ’
yes – you
could say ‘this point is the centre a of circle’ – but it is not the same
proposal as ‘this is a circle’
the point
is that these statements will have different uses –
likely –
in different contexts
‘All that I am saying comes to this, that O(x) must
be an external description of x’
an internal description – an external description –
these are descriptions of description
there is no definite description – and there is
definite description of description –
any description is open to question
‘“Is it conceivable that two things have all their
properties in common?” – If it isn’t conceivable, then neither is its
opposite?’
if there
are two things – their spatial
position descriptions – will be different –
and so
they won’t have all their properties in common
the
opposite?
that two
things don’t have all their properties in common?
is just
to say there is more than one thing –
hardly
inconceivable
‘We do indeed talk about a circle, its diameter,
etc. etc., as if we were describing a concept in complete abstraction from the
objects falling under it. – But in that case ‘circle’ is not a predicate in the
original sense. And in general geometry is the place where concepts from the
most different regions get mixed up together.’
it is common practice to talk about a circle as if
we were describing a concept in complete abstraction from the objects falling
under it –
this is one way of talking about the proposal
‘circle’ –
and yes – there is a disconnect between this way of
talking about a circle – and regarding ‘circle’ as a predicate –
there is no conflict here –
what we have here is different approaches to –
different interpretations of – different uses of – ‘circle’
any proposal is open to question – open to doubt –
is uncertain
and it is this uncertainty that generates different
propositional responses
by the way – it is not just in geometry ‘where
concepts of different regions get mixed up together’ –
in propositional reality any ‘place’ – is fair game
for ‘concepts of different regions getting mixed up’
it’s the mix up – that is propositional reality
Appendix 3. Objects
‘ “In a certain sense, an
object cannot be described” (So too Plato: “You can’t give an account of one
but only name it.”) Here “object” means “reference of a not further definable
word” and ‘description” or “explanation” really means: “definition”. For of
course it isn’t denied that the object can be “described from outside”, that
properties can be ascribed to it and so on.
So when we use the
proposition above we are thinking of a calculus with signs or names that are
indefinable – or more accurately, undefined – and we are saying that no account
can be given of them.
“What a word means a
proposition cannot tell.” ’
first up – ‘object’ is a
description – a meta-description –
the very point of such a
description – is that it is a logical place for
description
‘a reference of not further
definable word’ –
what it is – is a reference
place for definition
‘described from the
outside’? –
here we have a theory of
description –
what if I don’t think in
terms of inside and outside –
what if my criterion for
description is utility – and thus when I set about describing I am looking for
a description that I imagine will be useful?
our descriptions are open
to question – open to doubt –
but so too any criteria of
description
‘So when we use the
proposition above we are thinking of a calculus with signs or names that are
indefinable – or more accurately, undefined – and we are saying that no account
can be given of them.’
a proposition is a proposal
–
open to question – open to
doubt – uncertain
and a name of course is a
proposal – open to question
a
calculus is a method of proceeding
the
terms of the calculus – of its operation – are definitions
while
in the use of a calculus – we may not question – its terms
nevertheless
– they are from a logical point of view
– open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
and
a look at the propositional history of a calculus –
shows
this quite clearly
it
is not that an account cannot be given of names –
if
a proposal / name is put – it is as a proposal – open to account
and
if a calculus is proposed – if it is to be functional –
an
account of it’s meaning and function must be presumed –
or
proposed
“What a word means a
proposition cannot tell.”
a word is a proposal open
to question – open to doubt
as with any proposal in
relation to it
‘What is the distinction
then between blue and red?’
yes – the question of
distinction –
the reality is that we do distinguish –
and any account –
‘explanation’ of this action of distinguishing –
will be open to question –
to doubt – will be uncertain
that we distinguish is
clear –
the grounds of any
distinction – are not
let’s be clear – an
explanation – is not the act
an explanation of a
distinction – is not the action of distinguishing
‘explanation’ is –
logically speaking – after the fact
the act – the act performed
– without explanation – is unknown –
we propose – put forward
propositions – descriptions – in order to
make known
and any ‘knowledge’ we have
– that is any proposal we make –
is uncertain
‘So what I am saying means:
red can’t be described.’
red is described
‘red’ is the commonly used name / description –
so – what of red – as
distinct from ‘red’
in the absence of
description – what you have is an unknown
any term proposed as a
description – is open to question
nevertheless where a term
has utility – it will have currency –
and for that matter – where
a term has currency –
it will have utility
‘ “If you call the colour
green an object, you must be saying that it is an object that occurs in the
symbolism. Otherwise the sense of the symbolism, and thus its very existence as
a symbolism, would not be guaranteed.”
But what does that assert
about green, or the word “green”?’
‘If you call the colour
green an object, you must be saying that it is an object that occurs in the
symbolism.’
you describe one
description ‘the colour green’ as an ‘object’ – that is you give it another
description
the symbolism?
if you propose that it occurs in the symbolism – this ‘object’ (the colour
green) –
so be it
‘Otherwise the sense of the
symbolism, and thus its very existence as a symbolism, would not be
guaranteed.’
the ‘symbolism’ is a
proposal – it exists – if it is proposed
‘But what does that assert
about green, or the word “green”?’
it asserts that green or
the word ‘green’ has been used – ‘translated’ – into a symbolism
Appendix 4. Elementary
Propositions
A1
‘Can a logical
product be hidden in a proposition? And if so, how does one tell, and what
methods do we have of bringing the hidden element of a proposition to light? If
we haven’t yet got a method, then we can’t speak of something being hidden or
possibly hidden. And if we do have a method of discovery then the only way in
which something like a logical product can be hidden in a proposition is the
way in which a quotient like 755 /3 is hidden until the division has been
carried out.
The question
whether a logical product is hidden in a sentence is a mathematical problem.’
‘Can a logical
product be hidden in a proposition?’
no
reason being – that
logically speaking nothing is hidden
so this distinction
between hidden and not hidden – is not valid
what you see is
what you get –
how you interpret
what you see – is open to question – open to doubt –
but any proposal
you make – in the way of interpretation –
is – what you see
what we have – is
the proposal – the proposition –
in the absence of
proposal – in the absence of description – what we face is not something
‘hidden’ – what we face – as plain as day – is what we don’t know – is the
unknown –
and the unknown is
not hidden –
it is as they say
‘in your face’
a quotient is not
‘hidden’ in a division – it is a way of describing the propositional operation
that is division
mathematics is a
sign-game
the ‘rules’ of
mathematics –‘determine’ –what is possible in the use of signs –
mathematics – is a
game of propositional discovery
you play the game
in accordance with the rules to see what the rule-play can generate
the rules – are proposals – and as with any set of
proposals – are open to question – open to doubt
however when you play – when you play the game – the very
point of it is to play in accordance with the rules –
questioning the
rules – is not playing the game – is not doing
mathematics
to question the
rules – is the business of meta-mathematics – the philosophy of mathematics
‘So an elementary
proposition which, in the calculus as I am now using it, is not represented as
a truth-function of other sentences.
The idea of
constructing elementary propositions (as e.g. Carnap has tried to do) rests on
a false notion of logical analysis. It is not the task of that analysis to
discover a theory of elementary
propositions, like discovering principles of mechanics.
My notion in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus was
wrong: 1) because I wasn’t clear about the sense of the words “a logical
product is hidden in a sentence” (and suchlike), 2) because I too thought that
logical analysis had to bring to light what was hidden (as chemical and
physical analysis does).
The proposition “this place is now red” (or “this circle is
now red) can be called an elementary proposition if this means that it is
neither a truth-function of other propositions nor defined as such. (Here I am
disregarding combinations such as p. : qv –q and the like.)
But from “a is now red” there follows “a is not now green”
and so elementary propositions in this sense aren’t independent of each other
like the elementary
propositions in the calculus I once described – a calculus
to which, misled as I was by a false notion of reduction. I thought that the
whole use of propositions must be reducible.’
there is no
elementary proposition
any so called
‘analysis’ of a proposition – is no more than the description of the
proposition – in terms of other propositions
we have a proposal
– and we go on to describe that proposal etc. etc. –
there is no logical
end to this
when you stop – presumably it is because you have
no need to proceed
presumably you have
described your proposal – in a manner that suits you –
the point is your
propositional description (of the proposal) – like any description – any
proposal –
is open to question
– open to doubt
is uncertain
the so called
‘elementary proposition’ – is not ‘a logical product’ – it is a rhetorical
devise –
the point of which
is to establish some propositional or philosophical ‘authority’ –
to cut right to the
chase here –
the only authority
is the authority of authorship –
beyond authorship –
any claim to an authority – is logically false –
any such claim is
simply pretentious –
more to the point –
this so called
‘elementary proposition’ – of Russell and of the Tractatus –
as with any
proposition – any proposal –
is open to question
– open to doubt –
it is a proposal – and as such – uncertain
‘elementary
proposition’ –
if this term is to
have any further use –
it is – I would
suggest – the proposition – you start with –
and that can be any proposition
‘truth-functional
analysis’ – is a logical game
yes – you can
formalize a proposition –
but this is nothing
but another description of the
proposition
the point of a
proposition is what is proposed –
restating the
proposal in formal terms –
is effectively
repeating or simply rewriting the proposition –
it does not bear on
what is proposed
‘analysis’ is
rubbish –
it’s rubbish in
logic – and it’s rubbish in life
there is no going
deeper – to find the ‘hidden’ truth or essence
what you have is
what is proposed – and yes you can propose in relation to that
forget the ‘hidden’
– there is only surface –
and once you
understand that –
the surface – goes
B1
‘If you want to use the
appellation “elementary proposition” as I did in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and as Russell used “atomic
proposition”, you may call the sentence “Here there is a red rose” an
elementary proposition. That is to say, it doesn’t contain a truth-function and
it isn’t defined by an expression that contains one.’
truth-functional analysis –
is a language-game
the idea of the elementary
or atomic proposition is that it refers to an elemental or atomic fact – that
can’t be further analyzed – and therefore is a foundation for knowledge
so the idea is – break a
sentence up into it’s grammatical / logical elements – and you can discover the
foundations of knowledge
yes – this logical-analysis
is elegant in its simplicity –
but just plain stupid in
its naivety – (or should that be – pretension?)
it is to turn the problem
of knowledge into a language-game
when in fact language – and
language-games – express the problem
any proposal is open to
question – open to doubt – is uncertain
this goes for atomic
sentences – molecular sentences – or any other way you want to carve it up
there is no foundation to
knowledge –
any proposed ‘foundation’ –
is like any other proposal – open to
question
this idea of a foundation –
is really the result of fear –
fear of the unknown
and that has spawned
deception and delusion – and the language-game – rhetoric
our proposals are uncertain
–
and it’s not an
epistemological crisis –
it is in fact the source of
our freedom and creativity
and to be frank – it’s not
that hard to get with the program
as to analysis –
once you understand that
there is no foundation –
then there is no going from
the surface – to the foundation – there is no going deeper
there is no logical depth –
there is no depth
no ‘hidden logical product’
– no hidden reality –
what there is – is what is
proposed
we put forward proposals –
propositions – and we propose – in relation to the propositions before us –
etc. – etc. –
this is the action of
language – propositions in relation to propositions
this is our world – this is
how it is made
it is all on the surface
‘What gives us the idea
that there is a kind of agreement between thought and reality? – instead of
‘agreement’ here one might say with a clear conscience “pictorial character”
this idea of agreement –
presumes a reality – a reality – with all the
features we think it has – independent of our thinking
how could we know such a reality is there –
independent of thinking it?
and if we accept that the features that it has –
are features – we think it has –
then what must it be – independent of our thinking?
the answer is – the unknown
and in that case there is no agreement –
all we have is a proposed reality –
what we face in the absence
of any proposal – is the unknown –
we propose – to make known
attached as we might be to
our propositional constructs – i.e. ‘thought’ – ‘reality’ – etc.
what we have here – what we
are dealing with – is proposals – propositions
my point really is – there
is no non-propositional reality –
we never leave the proposal
here Wittgenstein has put
forward a proposal for understanding reality – for dealing with the unknown
a proposal that puts that
there is an independent reality – and that the proposition pictures this
reality
further he looks at
problems with this proposal – and comes to the following conclusion –
‘So I am imagining that the
difference between proposition and reality is ironed out by the lines of
projection belonging to the picture, the thought, and that no further room is
left for a method of application, but only for agreement and disagreement’
‘only for agreement and
disagreement’ –
yes – the above proposal that Wittgenstein puts – is open to
question
and as with any proposal –
you can assent to it – or dissent from it –
and your assent – or your
dissent – like the proposition itself –
is open to question – open
to doubt – is uncertain
some proposals have a
longer half life than others
it is I think a question of
circumstance and utility
be that as it may –
any proposal – we make – or
operate with – regardless of whether it is entrenched or not –
is open to question – open
to doubt – is uncertain
Appendix 5. Is time essential to propositions? Comparison
between time and truth-functions
‘If we had a grammar set out in the form of a book, it
wouldn’t be a series of chapters side by side, it would have a different
structure. And it is here, if I am right that we would have to see the
distinction between phenomenological and non- phenomenological. There would be,
say a chapter about colours, setting out the rules for the use of colour-words;
but there would be nothing comparable in what the grammar had to say about the
words “not”, “or”, etc (the “logical constants”).
How does the temporal character of facts manifest itself?
How does it express itself, if not by certain expressions having to occur in
our sentences? That means: how does the temporal character of facts express
itself, if not grammatically? ”Temporal character” – that doesn’t mean that I
come at 5 o’clock, but that I come at some time or other, i.e. that my proposition
has the structure it has.
We are inclined to say that negation and disjunction are
connected with the nature of the proposition, but that time is connected with
its content rather than its nature.
But if the two are equally universal, how can it show itself
in grammar that one of them is connected with the nature of the proposition and
the other is not?
Or should I have said that time is not equally universal
since mathematical propositions can be negated and occur in disjunctions,
without being temporal. There is indeed a connection here, though this form of
portraying the matter is misleading.
But that shows what I mean by “proposition” or “the nature
of the proposition”.’
a proposition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
we can further describe – the proposition – in
terms of other proposals – i.e. ‘phenomenological’ – ‘non-phenomenological’ –
we can put forward the proposal of form – and the
proposal of content – the proposal of grammar
these are descriptive decisions –
to put forward a description of the proposition in
terms of logical constants – is to put forward a structural description
and you can say it is a description of possibility
– possibilities within a structure –
possibilities of manipulation – of use –
and further we can question the relation between a
proposal of form and a proposal of content – in relation to time
looking at a proposition in terms of time – is one
way of considering it
i.e. – is the form non-temporal and the content
temporal?
and if so how can this be?
this is the discussion Wittgenstein embarks on
there is no necessity to describe a proposal – in
these terms
but by the same token – there is nothing to stop
you describing the proposition in this way
the proposition – any proposition – is open to
question – in any way you want to
question it – it is open to any doubts you have – open to any kind of
description –
it’s nature is uncertain
it strikes me that you can view the proposition –
be it ‘phenomenological’ – ‘non-phenomenological – mathematical – or whatever –
as temporal
I question and doubt – deal with uncertainty – in
time
and yes – I can regard the action of questioning –
of doubt – of uncertainty – as not being
related to time –
i.e. a proposal is a proposal – regardless of when
it is put forward
why you would describe a proposition in terms of
either or both – depends just on what you are doing and why – it’s a question
of use
Wittgenstein asks –
‘how does the temporal character of facts express itself, if
not grammatically?’
firstly it is important to understand that a ‘fact’ is what
is proposed – a fact is a proposal
secondly – the proposal – in whatever form – is the expression
now you may wish to explain that – grammatically –
any ‘explanation’ though will be a proposal – and
as such an expression
there will be no ‘explanation’ of the proposition –
that is beyond question – that is beyond doubt –
no fix on
the proposition
just as the proposition itself – logically speaking
is no fix – on anything
we propose – and just what that amounts to – how we
describe that action – how we account for it – is logically speaking – up for
grabs –
the point of a proposition is its use –
and mostly – I think we run with what is at hand –
in whatever context we are operating in –
we have learnt usage
–
and propositional usage is not an optional extra –
it is a natural necessity –
a natural necessity if we are to be functioning
human beings
however logically speaking –
any usage is open to question –
is uncertain
Appendix 6. The Nature of Hypotheses
‘You could obviously explain an hypothesis by means of
pictures. I mean, you could explain the hypothesis “there is a book lying here”
with pictures showing the book in plan, elevation and various cross sections.’
what you do here is propose that the pictures represent the
proposal ‘there is a book lying there’ –
and yes – argue the case
‘Such a representation gives a law. Just as the
equation of a curve gives a law, by means of which you may discover the
ordinates, if you cut at different abscissae.
In which case the verification of particular cases
correspond to cuts that have already been made.
If our experiences yield points lying on a straight
line, the proposition that these experiences are various views of a straight
line is an hypothesis.
The hypothesis is a way of representing this
reality, for a new experience may tally with it or not, or possibly make it
necessary to modify the hypothesis.’
such a representation – is an hypothesis – is a proposal
if an hypothesis / proposal is regarded as a ‘law’ – then it is taken to
have a stable application and outcome across a defined domain
this is really a decision of practice –
the logic of it is that the ‘law’ – as with any
proposal – is open to question
‘verification’ of an hypothesis – of a proposal –
is always open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –
reality is propositional – new proposals – new
realities
the ‘new experience’ – is a new proposal
and yes – the new proposal – may or not tally with
the hypothesis under consideration
‘If for instance we use a system of coordinates and
the equation for a sphere to express the proposition that a sphere is located a
certain distance from our eyes, this description has a greater multiplicity
than that of verification by eye. The first multiplicity corresponds to not one
verification but to a law obeyed by
verifications.’
‘a greater multiplicity than verification by the
eye’?
the system of coordinates and the equation – is a different method of verification –
than that of verification by the eye
any so called ‘verification’ – or any method of verification – is a proposal
–
open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –
what you go with – what you operate with – will be
a function of circumstance and context –
it is a question of behaviour – and all the
questions that go with that
a greater multiplicity – is this to suggest –
greater verification?
a greater multiplicity of verification proposals –
will mean a greater number of proposals – open to
question – open to doubt –
quantitatively speaking – more uncertain proposals
to deal with –
more ways of seeing – more ways of doing –
more possibilities
‘The first multiplicity corresponds to not one
verification but to a law obeyed by
verifications’ –
yes – the ‘law’ –
the proposal –
to which a method of assessment is applied
here you have a method involving not one proposal
of verification – but a multiplicity
there is no ‘obedience’ here – there is just
proposal – and accepted practice
‘An hypothesis is a law for forming propositions.
You could also say: an hypothesis is a law for forming
expectations.
A proposition is, so to speak, a particular cross-section of
an hypothesis.’
an hypothesis is a logically transparent form or expression of the proposition
it displays the logic of the proposition – openly
it is a clear expression of uncertainty –
as for ‘law’ – there are no laws – only proposals –
the form of the proposition – is not essential – what is essential
is the logic of the proposition –
the proposition is a proposal
–
open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
‘According to my principle two suppositions must have the
same sense if every possible experience that confirms the one also confirms the other,
if, that is, no decision between the two is conceivable on the basis of
experience.’
‘every possible experience …’
you can’t know
‘every possible experience’ –
so it’s a waste of time pretending
to consider the notion
you can only go with what is proposed
as for sense –
sense is a moving feast
the sense of a proposition is only revealed when it is proposed –
and then it is open to question – open to doubt
sense is uncertain
confirmation can only be a hunch in the midst of uncertainty
–
‘experience’ – is logically speaking an open concept –
how it is defined will depend on who’s doing what –
and any ‘definition’ here – will be open to question
a decision is always ‘conceivable’ –
at the very least you decide to proceed – or not to proceed
– with whatever it is that you have in mind
helps if there are a lot of nodding heads – one way or the
other
dress it up anyway you like –
any proposal – or assessment – or decision –
logically speaking –
is open to question – open doubt
uncertain
‘The representation of a curve as a straight line with
deviations. The equation of the curve includes a parameter whose course
expresses the deviations from a straight line. It isn’t essential that these
deviations should be “slight”. They can be so large that the curve doesn’t look
like a straight line at all. “Straight line with deviations” is only one form
of description. It makes it easier for me to eliminate, or neglect, a
particular component of the description if I so wish. (The form “rule with
exceptions”).’
‘The representation of a curve as a straight line with
deviations’
“Straight line with deviations” is only one form of
description’ –
yes the proposal – the representation – is open to question
– open to interpretation –
open to different descriptions –
‘(The form “rule with exceptions”).’ –
a rule is a proposal – open to question – to doubt
a propositional game is played in accordance with its rules
where a rule is changed – the game changes
the ‘game’ pretends an order and structure to a
propositional activity
we find this pretence useful
‘What does it mean, to be certain that one has a toothache?
(If one can’t be certain, then
grammar doesn’t allow the use of the word ‘certain’ in this connection.)
The grammar of the expression ‘to be certain”.’
the proposal that you have a tooth ache – is fair enough
but as with any proposal – it is open to question
i.e. the pain you
experience – may not be a tooth ache as such –
what you are experiencing may be a disorder in another part
of your body –
manifesting as a tooth ache –
and of course the question – just where is the locus of
pain?
is it the tooth – or is it the brain?
a ‘brain-pain’ – might work in a rough sense – from a
neurological point of view
but is hardly useful if you are trying to explain to a
dentist where your pain is
‘The grammar of the expression to be certain’ –
is the grammar of delusion
‘We say “If I say that I see a chair there, I am saying more
than I know for certain”. And commonly that means “But all the same, there’s
one thing that I do know for certain.” But if we now try to say what it is, we
find ourselves in a certain embarrassment.
“I see something brown
– that is certain.” That’s meant to say that the brown colour is seen and not
perhaps merely conjectured from other symptoms. And we do indeed say quite
simply: “I see something brown.” ’
‘I do know something for certain … But if we try to say what
it is, we find ourselves in a certain embarrassment’ –
anything we say – is a proposal
– and a proposal is open to question – open to doubt –
is uncertain
point being – certainty has no place in propositional logic
–
the claim of certainty – is the failure to understand
propositional logic –
it is illogical
now this is not to say that the claim of certainty does not
have a place or function in language use –
it does –
it basis – and it function though – is not logical – it is rhetorical
the claim of certainty is a rhetorical devise –
it’s function – is persuasion
‘I see something brown
– that is certain’ –
is a good example of
this
the proposal ‘I see something brown’ – is a straightforward
proposal
‘that is certain’ –
is no more than the attempt to persuade – either myself – or others –
of what I say
‘I see something brown’ – like any other proposal – is open
to question – open to doubt –
is uncertain
the embarrassment that Wittgenstein refers to – only occurs
if you think you are making a logical statement
if on the other hand – you are aware that you claim to certainty
– is purely rhetorical –
then you should feel no embarrassment at all
‘If someone tells me “look into this telescope, and make me
a sketch of what you see”, the sketch I make is the expression of a
proposition, not of a hypothesis.’
the sketch I make is
a proposal – is a proposition –
open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
‘If I say “here there is a chair”, I mean more – people say
– than the mere description of what I perceive. This can only mean that the
presupposition doesn’t have to be true, even though the description fits what
is seen. Well in what circumstance would I say that that proposition wasn’t
true? Apparently, if certain other propositions aren’t true that were implicit
in the first. But it isn’t as if the first turns out to have been a logical
product all along.’
a proposition is put –
it is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
‘presuppositions’ here – are propositional arguments in
relation to a proposition put
what is true is what is affirmed – what is accepted
you may accept the proposition – but not the presuppositions
proposed in relation to it
or you may accept a presupposition argument – and decide
against the proposition
‘But it isn’t as if the first turns out to have been a
logical product all along.’
you can construct a propositional story around a
subject proposition –
this is to say – play a language-game
and the game you play could be ‘logical product’ –
interesting – inventive – and useful as such a game
might be –
it is in the end – no more than a proposal –
that as with any proposal – is open to question –
open to doubt – uncertain
there is no propositional story you have to
subscribe to
‘The best comparison for every hypothesis. – something that
is itself an example of an hypothesis –
is a body in relation to a systematic series of views of it from different
angles.’
yes – a proposal (a body) – open to question – open to doubt
– uncertain
that is than a subject of different proposals (views) – that
are held open to question – to doubt – and are regarded as uncertain
that is logical
behaviour
‘Making a discovery in a scientific investigation (say in
experimental physics) is of course not the same thing as making a discovery in
ordinary life outside the laboratory; but the two are similar and a comparison with the former can throw light on the
latter.’
our propositions – our proposals – are open to question –
open to doubt – are uncertain
it is this logical uncertainty that is the basis or ground
of discovery – of propositional discovery –
in whatever propositional context we are engaged in
‘There is an essential distinction between propositions like
“That is a lion”, “The sun is larger than the earth”, and propositions like
“Men have two hands”. Propositions like the first pair contain a “this”, “now”,
“here” and thus connect immediately with reality. But if there happened to be
no men around, how would I go about checking the third proposition?’
there is no ‘essential distinction’ here –
the above propositions are proposals – open to question – open to doubt
‘how would I go about checking the third proposition’?
there is no ‘checking’ – all you can do is propose in
relation to the proposition
and the likely proposal would be – ‘I am a man I have two
hands’ –
and this proposal like the one it is a response to –
is open to question
‘At all events, there can’t be any distinction between an
hypothesis used as an expression of an immediate experience and a proposition
in the stricter sense.’
yes –
there is no logical distinction between an hypothesis and a
proposition
the proposition is a proposal
the hypothesis is a proposition
‘an expression of an immediate experience’ – is a proposal –
there is no ‘proposition in the stricter sense’ –
the great beauty of the proposition – of the proposal –
is that it is without
strictures –
it is open – open
to question – open to doubt
it’s ground is uncertainty –
and uncertainty –
is the ground of possibility
‘There is a distinction between a proposition like “Here there
is a sphere in front of me” and “it looks as if there is a sphere in front of
me.” The same thing shows itself also thus: one can say “there seems to be a
sphere in front of me”, but it is senseless to say “it looks as if there seems
to a sphere in front of me”. So too one can say “Here there is probably a
sphere”, but not “Here there probably appears to be a sphere”. In such a case
people would say “After all, you must know whether there appears to be”.’
yes – we have here different expressions – different
proposals –
and any differences will come out because these proposals –
these propositions – as with any proposal – any proposition – are open to
question – open to doubt
the proposal – the proposition – is logically speaking –
open –
it invites question – it invites doubt –
it is in response to this logical uncertainty that
propositions are modified for use – made context useful – made actionable –
and it is out of this – logical uncertainty – that new
proposals – new ways of thinking – and doing – emerge
it is good to have a question about the sense of proposition
– no harm done having a hard look at a proposition and seeing whether and how
it will function
however function here – is function in context –
and unless you have a good grasp of the context in which a
proposal has been put –
you really can’t get into the business of saying whether it
makes sense
just presenting a proposal – out of context – and examining
it – in a so called ‘objective’ fashion – is small potatoes
neat little language game
actual language use – is flesh and blood – gesture – face – eyes – and history – in the
colours and the substance of the world – place and time
if you think you understand where someone is coming from –
and this is not always easy – it doesn’t always happen – what they say and how
they say it – strange as it might be – can make sense
“Here there probably appears to be a sphere”. In such a case
people would say “After all, you must know whether there appears to be”.’
what you know is
what you propose
and what you propose is open to question –
‘here there probably appears to be a sphere’-
perhaps there is a question as to whether the shape that
appears is a sphere?
who knows why there is a doubt here – but nevertheless a
doubt is expressed
and in response to this doubt – a probability assessment is
made –
probability is an assessment of uncertainty
‘There is nothing hypothetical in what connects the
proposition with the given fact.’
the so called ‘given
fact’ is nothing more than a proposal
– open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
a proposition – that is to say a proposal – in relation
to – another proposal – ‘the given fact’
– is likewise – open to question – open to doubt
is what connects the proposition to this ‘given fact’ –
hypothetical?
that is – is the
proposal of a relation – of any sort of relation – between the two
propositions – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain?
yes – of course
‘It is clear that reality – I mean immediate experience –
will sometimes give an hypothesis the answer yes, and sometimes the answer no
(here of course the “yes” and “no” express only confirmation and lack of
confirmation); and it is clear that these affirmations and denials can be given
expression.’
reality is what we propose –
‘immediate experience’ – is a proposal
what we propose is open to question – open to doubt –
uncertain
propositional uncertainty – is the source of all questioning
–
the source of all answering
it is propositional users – who ask questions –
and propositional users who give answers
‘yes’ and ‘no’ –
assent and dissent – are proposals –
open to question – open to doubt –
uncertain
‘The hypothesis, if that
face of it is laid against reality, becomes a proposition.’
the hypothesis is a proposition – is a proposal
‘laid against reality’?
propositions are laid against propositions
‘reality’ – is a proposition – is a proposal
what such a proposal amounts to is a propositional question
–
a propositional question that will be answered with
proposals –
with propositions –
propositions – open to question – open to doubt –
uncertain
‘It may be doubtful whether the body I see is a sphere, but
it can’t be doubtful that from here it looks to be something like a sphere. –
The mechanism of hypothesis would not function if appearance too were doubtful
so that one couldn’t verify beyond doubt even a facet of the hypothesis. If
there were a doubt here, what could take that doubt away? If this connection
too were loose, there would be no such thing as confirming an hypothesis and it
would hang entirely up in the air, quite pointless (and therefore senseless).’
‘It may be doubtful whether the body I see is a sphere, but
it can’t be doubtful that from here it looks to be something like a sphere.’?
‘it looks to be something like a sphere’ –
this proposition that purports to be beyond doubt –
expresses a doubt –
‘something like a
sphere’ – makes clear the uncertainty of the perception – of the proposition
quite apart from this though –
what we have here is a proposal
–
and the proposal – the proposition – regardless of who holds
it – and how they hold it – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
‘The mechanism of hypothesis would not function if
appearance too were doubtful so that one couldn’t verify beyond doubt even a
facet of the hypothesis’?
the ‘hypothesis’ – is a proposal – is a proposition
any statement of appearance – like any other proposal – any
other proposition – is open to question – open to doubt
one cannot verify beyond doubt –
any verification proposal – is open to question – to doubt
‘If there were a doubt here, what would take that doubt
away?’
only another doubt –
the point is we operate with and in uncertainty –
we make calls – we adopt proposals – we deal with – and
indeed – we make the world we live in –
however whatever we propose – decide or make –
is open to question – open to doubt –
is uncertain
‘If this connection too were loose, there would be no such
thing as confirming an hypothesis and it would hang entirely up in the air,
quite pointless (and therefore senseless).’?
any confirmation of an hypothesis – is open to question –
open to doubt – is uncertain
this is really so obvious – it shouldn’t need to said
any confirmation – logically speaking – is – up in the air
the fact that a decision is made to proceed on the basis of
a so called ‘confirmation’ –
is anything but pointless
logical uncertainty – does not equal inaction
we act – the logical safety net that we have – is propositional uncertainty –
for while we adopt a proposition – run with a proposal – we
always have the option to review – to reconsider –
this possibility of review is not some optional extra – it
is of the nature of the proposition – of any proposition
‘If I say “I saw a chair”, that (in one sense) isn’t
contradicted by the proposition “there wasn’t one there”. For I could use the
first proposition in the description of a dream and then nobody would use the
second to contradict me. but the
description of the dream throws a light on the sense of the words “I saw”.
Again, in the proposition “there wasn’t one there”, the word
“there” may have more than one meaning?’
yes but why is the
question?
and the answer goes to
the heart of philosophical logic –
it is because any proposition – any proposal is open to
question – open to doubt – is uncertain
and what these examples of
‘saw’ and ‘there’ – show –
is that from a logical point of view the terms of any
proposal – are proposals – open to
question – open to doubt – uncertain –
meaning – is uncertain –
we only define meaning in terms of our proposals – in
propositional terms –
and these proposals themselves – can be questioned – as it
were from any angle at all
you can move forward with a proposal – and you can and do
move forward in uncertainty –
but nothing you move forward with is logically stable
‘I am in agreement with the opinions of contemporary
physicists when they say that signs in their equations no longer have any
“meanings” and that physics cannot attain to such meanings, but must stay put
at the signs. But they don’t see that signs have meaning in as much as – and
only in as much as – observable phenomena do or do not correspond to them, in
however circuitous a manner.’
if the ‘contemporary physicists’ are saying that the signs
in their equations have no definite or certain meaning – they are right –
as to saying physics ‘cannot attain to such meanings’ –
physicists work – as indeed we all do – in uncertainty
the equations they use – are open to question to doubt – are
uncertain –
the logical reality of the proposition – whatever form it
takes –
is no argument against its use
physicists operate in uncertainty – with uncertainty
and if by ‘signs’ here we mean syntax – the logical reality
is that syntax will be interpreted –
to ‘stay put at the signs’ – without any interpretation – is
simply an argument for silence – for inactivity – it’s a recipe for nothing
if by to ‘stay put at the signs’ – one means – that one
doesn’t question or doubt – a given meaning –
then to ‘stay put at the signs’ – is to come to a logical
stand still –
fortunately this does not happen
‘observable phenomena do or do not correspond to them’
firstly what counts as ‘observable phenomena’ –
is just what is proposed – as observable phenomena
any such proposal is open to question – to doubt – is
uncertain
and secondly –
whether a physicist’s equation – with all it’s uncertainty –
applies to a proposal of ‘observable phenomena’ – will be – logically speaking
– open to question – to doubt –
this is just the way of it –
this logical reality – understood or not – does not stop the
business of proposal – of science
‘Let us imagine that chess has been invented not as a board
game, but as a game to be played with numbers and letters on paper, so that no
one had ever imagined a board with 64 squares in connection with it. And now
suppose someone made the discovery that the game corresponded exactly to a game
which could be played on a board in such and such a way. This discovery would
have been a great simplification of the game (people who would earlier have
found it difficult could now play it.) But it is clear that this new
illustration of the rules of the game would be nothing more than a new, more
easily surveyable symbolism, which in other respects would be on the same level
as the written game. Compare with this the talk about physics nowadays not
working with mechanical models but “only with symbols”.’
propositions – proposals – open to question – open
to doubt – uncertain – can take different forms
Appendix 7. Probability
‘The probability of an hypothesis has its measure in how
much evidence is needed to make it profitable to throw it out.
It is only in this sense that we can say that repeated uniform
experience in the past renders the continuation of this uniformity in the
future profitable.
If, in this sense, I now say: I assume the sun will rise
again tomorrow, because the opposite is so unlikely, I here mean by “likely”
and “unlikely” something completely different from what I mean by these words
in the proposition “It’s equally likely that I’ll throw heads or tails”. The
two meanings of the word “likely” are, to be sure, connected in certain ways,
but they aren’t identical.
We only give up an hypothesis for an ever higher gain.’
‘The probability of an hypothesis has its measure in how
much evidence is needed to make it profitable to throw it out.’
throwing it out or keeping it in – any ‘measure’ – just is
no more than speculation
as for ‘profitability’ – that you will find is a moving
feast –
‘profitability’ I think has more to do with motivation to
keep going than it has to do with outcome
‘It is only in this sense that we can say that repeated
uniform experience in the past renders the continuation of this uniformity in
the future profitable.’
does repeated uniform experience in the past render the
continuation of this uniformity in the future profitable?
you might well imagine so – hope so – but how would you
know?
at best all we have here is speculation
‘If, in this sense, I now say: I assume the sun will rise
again tomorrow, because the opposite is so unlikely, I here mean by “likely”
and “unlikely” something completely different from what I mean by these words
in the proposition “It’s equally likely that I’ll throw heads or tails”. The
two meanings of the word “likely” are, to be sure, connected in certain ways,
but they aren’t identical.’
the ‘unlikely’ in the sun will rise tomorrow – is pretence
the ‘equally likely’ in the heads or tails game –
is a logical statement – an either / or statement – a
disjunction
‘We only give up an hypothesis for an ever higher gain.’
we might give up an hypothesis – because we have given up
we might decide to go back to the drawing board
‘Induction is a process based on a principle of economy.’
induction may start out economically – but in so far as it
leads to generalization –
it loses any claim to economy
‘The question how simple a representation is yielded by
assuming a particular hypothesis is directly connected, I believe with the
question of probability.’
assuming a particular hypothesis – may or may not yield a
‘simple representation’-
it does depend on just how you define simple –
‘directly connected with the question of probability’?
yes – if probability is about limiting the domain of
speculation
‘We may compare a part of an hypothesis with the movement of
a gear, a movement that can be stipulated without prejudicing the intended
motion. But then of course you have to make appropriate adjustments to the rest
of the gear if it is to produce the desired motion. I’m thinking of a
differential gear. – Once I’ve decided that there is to be no derivation from a
certain part of my hypothesis no matter what the experience to be described may
be, I have stipulated a mode of representation and this part of my hypothesis
is now a postulate.’
well yes – you can decide
to do this – and proceed on that basis –
and like any decision – it is open to question – to doubt –
is uncertain –
‘A postulate must be such that no conceivable experience can
refute it, even though it may be extremely inconvenient to cling to the
hypothesis. To the extent that we can talk here of greater or slighter
convenience, there is a greater or slighter probability of the postulate’
if the ‘postulate’ is such that no conceivable experience
can refute it –
then it is effectively empty – and as such – a pretence
and greater or slighter inconvenience –
amounts to saying that we will proceed on the basis of the
postulate – regardless of what happens
such an approach has no empirical content –
and therefore nothing to do with probability
probability is speculation as to what will occur –
it is empirical speculation
‘It is senseless to talk of a measure for this probability
at this juncture. The situation here is like that in the case of two kinds of
numbers where we can with a certain justice say that one is more like the (closer to it) than a third, but there isn’t
any numerical measure of similarity. Of course you could imagine a measure
being constructed in such cases, too by say counting the postulates or axioms
common to the two systems, etc. etc.’
a measure for probability – comes down to an argument for
your hunch
you can’t measure what will occur – there is nothing to
measure
‘I give someone the following piece of information, and no
more: at such and such a time you will see a point of light in the interval AB.
Does the question now make sense “Is it more likely that
this point will appear in the AC than CB”? I believe, obviously not – I can of
course decide that the probability of the event’s happening in CB is to be in
the ratio CB/AC to the probability of it’s happening in AC; however, that’s a
decision I can have empirical grounds for making, but also about which there is
nothing to be said a priori. It is
possible for the observed distribution of events not to lead to this
assumption. The probability, where infinitely many possibilities come into
consideration, must of course be treated as a limit. That is, if I divide the
stretch AB into arbitrarily many parts of arbitrary lengths and regard it as
equally likely that the event should occur in any one of these parts, we
immediately have the simple case of dice before us. And now I can – arbitrarily
– lay down a law for constructing parts of equal likelihood. For instance, the
law that, if the lengths of the parts are equal, they are equally likely. But
any other law is just as permissible.’
correct –
given that we don’t know where and when the point of light
will appear in AB –
any guess is just as permissible
‘Couldn’t I, in the case of dice too, take, five faces
together as one possibility, and oppose them to the sixth as the second
possibility? And what, apart from experience, is there to prevent me from
regarding these two possibilities as equally likely?’
there is nothing to prevent you from proposing this game –
constructing this game –
playing this game
‘Let’s imagine throwing, say, a red ball with one very small
green patch on it. Isn’t it much more likely in this case for the red area to
strike ground than the green? – But how would we support this proposition?
Presumably by showing that when we throw the ball, the red strikes the ground
much more often than the green. But that is nothing to do with logic. – we may
always project the red and green surfaces and what befalls them onto a surface
in such a way that the projection of the green surface is greater than or equal
to the red; so that the events, as seen in this projection, appear to have
quite a different probability ratio from the one they had on the original
surface. If, e.g. I reflect the events in a suitably curved mirror and now
imagine what I would have held to be the more probable event if I had only seen
the image in the mirror.
The one thing the mirror can’t alter is the number of
clearly demarcated possibilities. So that if I had n coloured patches on my
ball, the mirror would also show n, and if I had decided that these are to be
regarded as equally likely, then I can stick to this decision for the mirror
image too.
To make myself even clearer: if I carry out the experiment
with a concave mirror, i.e.
make the observations
in a concave mirror, it will perhaps look as if the ball falls more often on
the small surface than on the much larger one; and it’s clear that neither
experiment – in the mirror or outside it – has a claim to precedence.’
what is more likely?
the fact is we can’t know what will happen –
so we can’t know what is more likely
probability is a game
it is a game of pretence
it pretends knowledge
‘We may apply our old principle to propositions expressing a
probability and say, we shall discover their sense by considering what verifies
them.
If I say “That will probably occur” is this proposition
verified by the occurrence or falsified by it non-occurrence? In my opinion,
obviously not. In that case it doesn’t say anything about either. For if a
dispute were to arise as to whether it is probable or not, it would always be
arguments from the past that would be adduced. And this would be so even when
what actually happened was already known.’
yes – arguments from the past – like arguments of the
present – cannot predict what the future will be
as to verification of ‘probability statements’ – there is no
verification – or falsification
such statements – and I would have thought this obvious – have no empirical content
‘Causality depends on an observed uniformity. This does not
mean that a uniformity so far observed will always continue, but what cannot be
altered is that the events so far have been uniform; that can’t be the uncertain result of an empirical series which in
its turn isn’t something dependent on another uncertain one and so on ad infinitum.’
causality is a proposal
– that relates event-propositions –
a proposal of
observed uniformity – as with any proposal –
any proposition –
is open to question – to doubt – is uncertain
‘but what cannot be altered is that the events so far have
been uniform’?
the proposal that
the events so far have been uniform – is
open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
it can be altered
and it can be replaced – it can be dropped altogether –
‘that can’t be the
uncertain result of an empirical series which in its turn isn’t something
dependent on another uncertain one and so on ad infinitum.’
a proposal – a proposition put – is not ‘dependent’ – not dependent on anything
it is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
‘When people say that the proposition “it is probable that p
will occur” says something about the event p, they forget that the probability
remains even when the event p does not occur.’
when the statement is made – you don’t know whether the
event p will occur or not
to claim that it is probable that it will occur – is to make
a pretentious claim
that is to claim to know – when you don’t know – when you
can’t know
but nevertheless you pretend to know
so yes – this pretence – will have – can have – nothing at
all to do – with whether the event occurs or not
‘The proposition “p will probably occur” does indeed say
something about the future, but not something “about the event p”, as the
grammatical form of the statement makes us believe.’
the proposition ‘p will probably occur’ – proposes that we can say something about the future –
and of course we can – we do
the question is – what are to make of such proposals?
in so far as we can’t know what the future holds – what are
we to say of statements that pretend this ‘knowledge’?
they can only be regarded for what they are –pretentious
by the way this is not to say that such statements don’t
have a place in propositional life –
clearly as a matter of fact they do –
a good deal of our propositional action – is pretentious –
that is the reality
Wittgenstein is right – ‘p will probably occur’ – says
nothing about the event p –
what it does say – is that where we do not have knowledge –
we pretend that we do –
it speaks of the human being
‘If I ask for the grounds of an assertion, the answer to the
question holds not only for this person and this
action (assertion), but quite generally.’
an assertion is a proposal – open to question – open to
doubt – uncertain
the ‘grounds of an assertion’ – are the arguments for the
assertion
these arguments are open to question – open to doubt –
uncertain
what do we mean by an argument holding for an assertion?
well firstly it must be applied to the assertion –
and if it ‘holds’ – presumably it is accepted by those
involved – as giving ground for the assertion
now even if that is the case –
of course we can’t say whether or not that will be the case in the future –we
simply don’t know
we can of course pretend to know –
or less maliciously – make a guess – have a punt
‘If I say “the weather looks like rain” do I say anything
about the future weather? No; I say something about the present weather, by
means of a law connecting weather at any given time with weather at an earlier
time. This law must already be in existence, and we are using it to construct
certain statements about our experience. –
We might say the same of historical statements too. But I
was too quick to say that the proposition “the weather looks like rain” says
nothing about future weather. It all depends what is meant by “saying something
about something”. The sentence says just what it says.
The sentence “p will probably occur” says something about
the future only in a sense in which truth and falsehood are completely
independent of what will happen in the future.’
‘If I say “the weather looks like rain” do I say anything
about the future weather? No; I say something about the present weather, by
means of a law connecting weather at any given time with weather at an earlier
time.’
that is a fair enough analysis
‘ “saying something about something”. The sentence says just
what it says’ –
yes – but how the sentence is interpreted – how it is understood – is a question of context –
of circumstance –
point being – the matter – the sentence – is uncertain
‘‘p will probably occur’ says something about the future
only in a sense in which truth and falsehood are completely independent of what
will happen in the future.’
yes – you can ’t know what will occur – so there is no
question whether a probability statement is true or false
‘If we say: “the gun is now aiming at the point p” we aren’t
saying anything about where the shot will hit. Giving the point at which it is
aiming is a geometrical means of
assigning its direction. That this is a means we use is certainly connected
with certain observations (projectile parabolas, etc) but these observations
don’t enter into our present description of the direction.’
yes – this is fair enough
‘A Galtonian photograph is the picture of probability.
The law of probability is the natural law you see when you
screw up your eyes.’
the probability statement at base expresses
uncertainty –
however weighting a claim about the future in terms of a
particular outcome –
is pretentious –
harmless in most cases – but pretentious nevertheless
there is a sense in which you can say the probability
statement – has a bet both ways –
it has one foot in uncertainty – and the other in
definiteness
and how are we to regard this?
you could get serious about it and call it corrupt – but I
think it is probably best to see it as a fun proposal –
(that will upset the hard heads)
‘A Galtonian photograph is the picture of a probability.
The law of probability is the natural law you see when you
screw up your eyes.’
as to the Galtonian photograph –
really – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
what you see when you screw up your eyes?
whatever that is – it is open to question
‘“On average the points yielded by the experiment lie on a
straight line”. “If I throw with a good die, then on average I throw one every
six throws”. What does that mean?
Is the proposition compatible with any experience I may
have? If so, it says nothing. Have I decided in advance which experiences are
incompatible with it and what is the limit beyond which exceptions may not go
without upsetting the rule? No. But couldn’t I have set such a limit? Of course
– Suppose that the limit has been set thus: if 4 out of 6 successive throws
turn out the same, then it’s a bad die. Now someone says: “But if that happens
only very seldom, mayn’t it be a good one after all?” To that the answer is as
follows. If I permit the turning up of 4 similar throws among 6 successive ones
to occur within a certain number of throws, then I am replacing the first limit
with a different one. But if I say
“any number of similar successive throws is allowed, as long as it happens
sufficiently rarely”, then strictly speaking I’ve defined the goodness of the
dies in a way that makes it independent of the result of the throws; unless by
the goodness of a die I do not mean a property of the die, but a property of a
particular game with it. In that case I can certainly say: in any game I call
the die good provided that among N throws of the game there occur not more than
log N similar successive throws. However, that doesn’t give a test for the
checking of dice, but a criterion for judging a particular game.’
“If I throw with a good die, then on average I throw one
every six throws”. What does that mean?
this is just a proposal
as to how throwing with a good die might
turn out
however you average it out – even as you play the game – you
don’t know what will happen – you can only guess
‘Is this proposition compatible with any experience I may
have?
you don’t know what experiences you may have –
so you don’t know
if it is compatible or not –
though you can speculate that it might be
in terms of knowing
what will happen – whether the die is good or not –
is irrelevant
‘Have I decided in advance which experiences are
incompatible with it and what is the limit beyond which exceptions may not go
without upsetting the rule?’
if you do – you set up rules for a game
‘Suppose that the limit has been set thus: if 4 out of 6
successive throws turn out the same, then it’s a bad die. Now someone says:
“But if that happens only very seldom, mayn’t be a good one after all?” To that
the answer is as follows. If I permit the turning up of 4 similar throws among
6 successive ones to occur within a certain number of throws, then I am
replacing the first limit with a different
one …’
what this is all about is how you construct the game
‘We say if the die is quite regular and isn’t interfered
with then the distribution of numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 among the throws must be
uniform, since there is no reason why
one number should occur more often than another.’
this is just a proposal as to how things might go –
and the claim that there is no reason why one number should occur more often than another is
just rhetoric
‘But now let’s represent the throws by the function (x – 3)
2 for the arguments 1 to 6, i.e. by the numbers 0, 1, 4, 9 instead of by
numbers 1 to 6. Is there any reason why one of these numbers should turn up in
the new results more often than another? This shows us that the a priori law of probability, like the
minimum-principles of mechanics etc., is a form that laws may take. If it had
been discovered by experiment that the distribution of the throws 1 to 6 with a
regular die was such that the distribution of the values of (x – 3) 2 was uniform, it would have been this regularity
that was defined as the a
priori regularity.
We do the same thing in the kinetic theory of gasses: we
represent the distribution of molecular movements in the form of some sort of
uniform distribution; but we make the choice of what is uniformly distributed – and in the case of what is reduced to a minimum – in such a way that our theory agrees
with experience.’
representing the throws by the function – only changes a
description or explanation of the game –
it doesn’t change the game – it doesn’t change the play
‘Is there any reason why one of these numbers should turn up
in the new results more often than another?’
no – unless you call ‘chance’ – a reason –
to claim that there is a reason is hubris
you can call the ‘principle’ on which you establish a game –
the principle you decide to base it on – ‘a
priori’ –
really all that amounts to is – ‘a game-proposal’–
the point of the game – of any game I would suggest – is to
find – or more correctly propose –
for the play – a regularity – a uniformity –
otherwise – whence the game?
‘We do the same thing in the kinetic theory of gasses: we
represent the distribution of molecular movements in the form of some sort of
uniform distribution; but we make the choice of what is uniformly distributed – and in the case of what is reduced to a minimum – in such a way that our theory
agrees with experience.’
yes – we propose a model – a uniformity – a game
“The molecules move purely according to the laws of
probability” is supposed to mean: physics gets out of the way, and now the
molecules move as it were according to the laws of logic. This idea is similar
to the idea that the law of inertia is an a
priori proposition: there too one speaks of what a body does when it isn’t
interfered with. But what is the criterion for it not being interfered with? is
it ultimately that it moves uniformly in a straight line? Or is it something
different? If the latter, then it’s a matter of experience whether the law of
inertia holds; if the former, then it wasn’t a law after all but a definition.
So too with the proposition, “if the particles aren’t interfered with, then the
distribution of their motion is such and such”. What is the criterion for their
not being interfered with? etc.’
‘The molecules move purely according to the laws of
probability’ –
means we can’t know how they will behave
‘This idea is similar to the idea that the law of inertia is
an a priori proposition’ –
yes – the ‘law’ of inertia – as a starting-place proposition
– a game proposal –
‘To say that the points yielded in this experiment lie
roughly on this line, e.g. a straight line, means something like: “seen for
this distance they seen to lie on a straight line.”
I may say that a stretch gives the general impression of a
straight line; but I cannot say: “This bit of line looks straight, for it could
be a bit of a line that as a whole gives me the impression of being straight.
(Mountains on the earth and moon. The earth a ball)’
‘seen for’ – or ‘seen from’? – anyway –
yes – you make a call – but there is always a question –
no proposal is beyond doubt
‘An experiment with dice lasts a certain time, and
our expectations about the future can only be based on tendencies we observe in
what happens during this experiment. That is to say, the experiment can only
give grounds for expecting that things will go in the way shown by the experiment; but we can’t expect that the
experiment, if continued, will now yield results that tally better with a
preconceived idea of its course than did those of the experiment we have
actually performed. So if, for instance, I toss a coin and find no tendency in
the result of the experiment itself for the number of heads and tails to
approximate to each other more closely, then the experiment gives me no reason
to suppose that if it were continued such an approximation would emerge.
Indeed, the expectation of such an approximation must itself refer to a definite point in time, since we can’t say we’re
expecting something to happen eventually,
in the infinite future.’
‘our expectations about the future can only be
based on tendencies we observe in what happens during this experiment’?
our expectations will be framed by the logical /
mathematical possibilities of the game
what we see during an experiment with the dice –
may be an outcome that we hoped for – however it is equally possible that what
we see during the experiment is not the outcome we hope for
the experiment as such – is no more than a playing
out of what is logically possible in the game
whether or not we observe ‘tendencies’ – is
irrelevant to what will happen
we don’t play in an infinite future – we play in
the present – and we only play for a certain amount of time –
so our expectation lasts as long as the game is
played
‘Any
‘reasonable expectation’ is an expectation that a rule we have observed up to
now will continue to hold.
(But the rule must have been observed and can’t,
for its part too, be merely expected.)’
in so far as we don’t know if the rule will
continue to hold – the expectation that it will – is not reasonable
‘The logic of probability is only concerned with
the state of expectation in the sense in which logic in general is concerned
with thinking.’
an expectation is a proposal –
open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
‘A ray is emitted from the light source S striking
the surface AB to form a point of light there and then striking the surface AB¢.
We have no reason to suppose that the point on AB lies to the left or to the right
of M, and equally none for supposing that the point on AB¢
lies on one side or other of m. This yields therefore incompatible
probabilities. But if I make an assumption about the probability of the point
on AB lying in AM, how is this assumption verified? Surely, we think, by a
frequency experiment. Supposing this confirms the view that the probabilities
of AM and BM are equal (and so the probabilities of Am and B¢m
differ), then it is recognized as the right one and thus shows itself to be an
hypothesis belonging to physics. The geometrical construction merely shows that
the fact that AM = MB was no ground
for assuming equal likelihood.’
this is a probability game –
on the face of it – it looks as if AB = MB
we have no reason for assuming that the ray strikes
any particular point of AB or AB¢
and because AB and AB¢ are not equal – we start with
incompatible probabilities
just an aside –
this incompatible probabilities argument – is
really something of a red herring
we don’t know
where the ray will hit – so any probability proposal– will be ‘incompatible’ –
with any other proposal
that’s the first point
the second point is that the AB / AB¢
argument proves to be irrelevant to the outcome of this game – a game of equal
likelihood
but we are dealing with a game here – so you can
regard the AB / AB¢
argument
as a diversion which if nothing else – spices up
the game
that’s the best I think you can say for it
so the question is – how can we assume equal
likelihood?
the answer proposed here is to make the assumption
that the point on AB lies in AM
and then to test this assumption with a frequency
experiment
and the next move in the game is –
‘Supposing this confirms the view that the
probabilities of AM and BM are equal (and so the probabilities of Am and B¢m
differ)’
now if these steps in the game are followed – what
we get is – bingo –
‘an hypothesis belonging physics’
that’s the game played out
Wittgenstein says –
‘The geometrical construction merely shows that the
fact that AM = MB was no ground for
assuming equal likelihood.’
well as good a reason – I would say – as making the assumption ‘about the
probability of the point on AB lying in AM’
or performing the frequency experiment
point being an assumption
is just that – a shot in the dark –
regardless of what arguments are found to support
it –
and as to the experiment –
what if the frequency experiment doesn’t show that
AM and BM are equal?
well of course that’s not part of the game
and let’s be clear about experiments in general –
an experiment at any point – is open to question –
to doubt – is uncertain
we are playing a game here – the game of equal
likelihood –
and there are different ways of playing it –
that’s all
‘Suppose that measurement shows the die to be
accurate and regular, that the numbers on its sides don’t influence the throws,
and that it is thrown by a hand whose movements follow no definite rules: does
it follow that the distribution among the throws from 1 to 6 will be uniform on
average? Where is the uniform distribution supposed to come from? The accuracy
and regularity of the die can’t establish that the distribution of throws will
be uniform on average. (It would be,
as it were, a monochrome premise with a mottle conclusion.) And we haven’t made
any suppositions about the movements while throwing. (Making the bundles of hay
equal gives reason to believe that the donkey will starve to death between
them; it doesn’t give reason to believe that he will eat from each with roughly
the same frequency.) –
It is perfectly compatible with our assumptions for
one hundred ones to be thrown in succession, if friction, hand-movements and
air resistance coincide appropriately. The experimental fact that this never
happens is a fact about those factors, and that the throws will be uniformly
distributed is an hypothesis about the operation of those factors.’
yes –
any proposal about what will happen – how it will happen –
in a game of dice
and any argument on these matters – is speculation –
open to question – open to doubt –
uncertain
‘Suppose someone says that a lever with arms of
equal length must remain at rest under the influence of equal and opposite
forces, since there is no cause to make it move to one side rather than to the
other. That only means that if the lever moves to one side after we have
ascertained the equality of arms and the equal and opposite nature of the
forces, then we can’t explain this on the basis of the preconditions we know or
have assumed. (The form that we call “explanation” must be asymmetrical: like
the operation which makes “2a + 3b” out of “a + b”). But on the basis of our
precondition we can indeed explain the lever’s continuance at rest. – Could we
also explain a swing to the left and right with equal frequency? No, because once
again the swing involves asymmetry; we could only explain the symmetry in this
asymmetry. If the lever had rotated to the right with a uniform motion, one
could similarly have said: given the symmetry of the conditions I can explain
the uniformity of the motion, but not its direction.’
the question here is what are you trying to
explain?
the lever at rest – or the lever in motion?
clearly an explanation of the lever at rest will
not work for the lever in motion –whether the motion is symmetrical or asymmetrical
and as for direction – that too – is another issue
you could also see this as a game that is played –
before the rules for its play have been proposed –
and then the question is – what are the rules that
govern the various plays?
‘A lack of uniformity in the distribution of the
throws is not to be explained by the symmetry of the die. It is only to this
extent that the symmetry explains the uniformity of the distribution. – For one
can of course say: if the numbers on the side of the die have no effect, then
the difference between them cannot explain an irregularity in the distribution;
and of course similar circumstances cannot explain differences; and so to that
extent one might infer a regularity. But in that case why is there any difference
at all between the different throws? Whatever explains that must also explain
their approximate regularity. It is just that the regularity of the die doesn’t
interfere with that regularity.’
‘a lack of uniformity in the distribution of the
throws is not to be explained by the symmetry of the die’ –
yes
‘It is only to this extent that the symmetry
explains the uniformity of the distribution. – For one can of course say: if
the numbers on the side of the die have no effect, then the difference between them
cannot explain an irregularity in the distribution; and of course similar
circumstances cannot explain differences; and so to that extent one might infer
a regularity.’
is not this – the regularity of irregularity?
‘but in that case why is there any difference at
all between the different throws?’
we don’t know why –
we can speculate – theorize – and any proposal put
forward – will be interesting –
but like the throws themselves – uncertain
‘regularity’ here – and ‘uniformity’ – and their
opposites too – are terms – the point of which is to get a fix – or pretend
that you can get a fix – on uncertainty –
really just descriptions of the game – the logic of
the game –
a logic that is grounded in uncertainty
game playing – including gambling – can be seen as
a way of directly experiencing the logical reality – the logical reality of
uncertainty –
game-playing is rightly seen as philosophical
practice –
to play is to throw yourself into a metaphysical
state –
it is to act logically – authentically
perhaps people take to gambling – and others forms
of game-playing in reaction to pretence
– the many faced pretences of claims to certainty
‘whatever explains that must also explain their
approximate regularity’
approximate regularity – approximate irregularity –
take your pick
the real point is that there will be no definitive
explanation
at best we can – as it were – map out or point to
the uncertainties involved –
but even here – any proposal will be open to
question to doubt – will be uncertain
something like throwing die – lays bear –
uncertainty
we begin with uncertainty – and the try to track it
–
but any tracking will be with propositions –
open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
here is an excellent illustration of the perfect
fit between reality and the proposition
‘It is just that the regularity of the die doesn’t
interfere with that regularity.’
the ‘regularity of the die’ – is to do with the
definition of the game – the structure of the game –
a game of chance
‘Suppose that a man throwing dice every day threw
nothing but ones for a week, using dice that proved good by every other method
of testing and that gave the usual results when thrown by others. Has he
grounds, now, for supposing that there is a law of nature that he will always
throw ones? Has he grounds for supposing it will go on like this, or has he
grounds for believing that this regularity can’t last much longer? Has he
reason to abandon the game since it has become clear that he can only throw
ones, or reason to play on since in these circumstances it is all the more
probable that he will throw a higher number at the next throw? In actual fact,
he will refuse to accept the regularity as a natural law: at least, it will
have to go on for a long time before he will entertain the possibility. But
why? I believe it is because so much of his previous experience in life speaks
against there being a law of nature of such a sort, and we have – so to speak –
to surmount all that experience, before embracing a totally new way of looking
at things.’
‘Has he grounds for supposing that there is a law
of nature that he will always throw ones?’
no –
he has grounds for saying that he has always thrown ones
he can conjecture that he will continue to throw
ones
but any such conjecture is no more than a
speculation – a shot in the dark
however he could propose the throwing of ones as a
‘law of nature’
and as with any law of nature – this ‘law’ – is
open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
a ‘law of nature’ – if you strip it of pretence –
is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –
is a shot in the dark – a conjecture – and an
ambitious one at that
we run with this class of conjectures – because
laws of nature have proved to be so fruitful – so useful to us
‘Has he grounds for supposing it will go on like
this, or has he grounds for believing that this regularity can’t last much
longer?’
no –
but he can make put these proposals –
make these conjectures
‘Has he reason to abandon the game since it has
become clear that he can only throw ones, or reason to play on since in these
circumstances it is all the more probable that he will throw a higher number at
the next throw?’
whatever course he takes – he has to deal with
uncertainty
‘In actual fact, he will refuse to accept the
regularity as a natural law: at least, it will have to go on for a long time
before he will entertain the possibility.’
perhaps –
‘But why? I believe it is because so much of his
previous experience in life speaks against there being a law of nature of such
a sort, and we have – so to speak – to surmount all that experience, before
embracing a totally new way of looking at things.’
well – this may be the case
but ‘embracing a totally new way of looking at
things’
is no big deal in itself –
it is really about understanding the logic of the
proposition –
that a proposition is a proposal – open to question
– open to doubt – uncertain
if this is understood – ‘surmounting all that
experience’ –
is a bit of a joke
‘If we infer from the relative frequency of an
event its relative frequency in the future,
we can of course only do that from the frequency
which has in fact been observed. And not from one we have derived from
observation by some process or other for calculating probabilities. For the
probability we calculate is compatible with any
frequency whatever that we
actually observe, since it leaves the time open.’
if it leaves the time open – it’s empirically
irrelevant
any ‘calculation of probabilities’ – is a claim on the future
what will
happen – is unknown
probability is a game –
imagining
that the past or the present is a guide to the future –
just is
the game
‘calculating’ – is playing the game
the only good
reason –
for playing this game –
is to have fun
NB
you won’t find ‘fun’ –
in a philosophical dictionary
but dare I say it?
fun should be taken –
seriously
‘When a gambler or insurance company is guided by
probability, they aren’t guided by the probability calculus, since one can’t be
guided by this on its own, because anything that happens can be reconciled with
it: no, the insurance company is guided by a frequency actually observed. And
that, of course, is an absolute frequency.’
yes – the ‘frequency actually observed – is the bet – as to the frequency that that will
be observed –
a proposal – a conjecture – open to question – open
to doubt – uncertain
Appendix 8. The concept “about”. Problem of the
“heap”.
‘ “He came from about there ®.”
“About there is the brightest point of the
horizon”.
“Make the plank about 2 m long”.’
‘about’ – is logically correct – and logically
honest
any so called ‘precise’ measurement is a piece of
rhetoric
point being any proposal of measurement – logically
speaking is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
any ‘precise’ measurement can always be questioned
to pretend a propositional certainty is to avoid or
deny the logical reality
we do just this – in any number of contexts – in
order to proceed – to get on with it –
and it really is just a pretence – and an
unnecessary one too –
for we can – in practise – quite easily accept the
reality – the propositional reality – of uncertainty – and proceed –
recognising that i.e. any proposed measurement – is open to question – open to
doubt – is uncertain
and I would suggest that in fact we do this all the
time
the quest for precision is best understood as an
heuristic endeavour –
the goal of which is functionality
‘The indeterminacy of the word “heap”.’ –
the word ‘heap’ is a logical exemplar –
it embodies uncertainty –
any proposal – any word – is open to question –
open to doubt – is uncertain
‘heap’ defeats any attempt to cover the this
logical reality –
it defeats any attempt at determination
it is – logically speaking – straight up –
unpretentious
